

**Statement of Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

**“National Security Bureaucracy for Arms Control,
Counterproliferation, and Nonproliferation Part I: The Role of the
Department of State”**

May 15, 2008

This is the second in a series of hearings that the Subcommittee is holding to explore the effectiveness and efficiency of government management in various aspects of national security. The first hearing considered proposed reforms to the U.S. export control system. Today's hearing focuses on the management of the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy at the Department of State, commonly known as the T Bureau.

Just as our last hearing disclosed serious problems in our export control licensing system, this hearing will examine disturbing management issues in the T Bureau. These issues include a hostile political environment, a poorly conducted reorganization in 2005, and a resultant loss of well-qualified Federal civil service employees. Senator Voinovich

and I recently requested the Governmental Accountability Office examine in-depth these disturbing developments.

Arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation are critical functions to our national security. If this bureaucracy is not doing its job, our security is jeopardized and the leadership of this bureau and the Department of State should be held accountable.

Our arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy has evolved since the end of the Cold War. In 1961 during the Kennedy Administration, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was established to address the growing international security threat posed by nuclear weapons and fears of a dangerous “missile gap” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, after almost 40 years of performing admirably, ACDA was disestablished. Its roles and responsibilities were placed under the Department of State since some viewed its stand-alone role as out of place in the post-Cold War world. This, in my view, was a tragic mistake.

Despite the many international efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, these weapons, especially nuclear, continue to pose a threat to international security. India and Pakistan detonated

nuclear devices in 1998 causing a regional nuclear crisis. North Korea, which opted out of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003, detonated a nuclear weapon in October 2006. Iran's nuclear program threatens stability in the Middle East. Pakistan's A. Q. Khan ran a secret black market of nuclear items which revealed a growing demand for nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of a weapon of mass destruction a "religious duty."

For the U.S. to handle these national and international security issues, we need not just good policies and international agreements but a healthy organizational structure to implement policies. My goal in this hearing is to identify possible recommendations for improving the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy.

The Department of State is the lead agency for managing U.S. arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation efforts. The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security leads the bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation, Political-Military Affairs, and Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.

This bureaucracy has changed from 1999, when it was an independent agency known as ACDA, until today. ACDA was merged into

the State Department bureaucracy, where its long-term and worldwide focus has unsuccessfully competed against prevailing regional and bilateral interests.

Since 2005 the bureaus singularly focused on arms control and nonproliferation have been eliminated. Our country's security has been imperiled by bureaucratic reorganization. If this Administration cannot begin to correct the damage, the next Administration must.

A number of concerns include:

- the loss of independent agency status for the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy making it less responsive to national needs;
- a loss of experienced Federal employees, especially those with critical physical and social science backgrounds;
- the overburdening of an assistant secretary handling arms control and nonproliferation; and
- fears that other nations may perceive our concern for these critical national security issues as weak and fleeting since the arms control bureau was merged into another bureau.

Some of the reforms I want to explore are:

- reestablishing an independent arms control agency or granting greater autonomy to the existing bureaus within the current structure;
- updating the bureau structure to support a greater focus on nonproliferation and arms control efforts; and
- ensuring that there are enough qualified arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation professionals to carry out national policies and our international obligations.

We cannot wait until terrorists, or more unfriendly states, obtain a nuclear weapon. Today's hearing will help us identify ways to reform the key government agency responsible for preventing this from happening.