

Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

**UNITED STATES SENATE**

INTERVIEW OF

Ass. Dir. [REDACTED]

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF PROTECTIVE  
OPERATIONS, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Friday, September 13, 2024

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON COURT REPORTING  
1029 VERMONT AVE, NW  
10TH FLOOR  
WASHINGTON, DC 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
[www.aldersonreporting.com](http://www.aldersonreporting.com)

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

**Witness**

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS,  
U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342  
Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C.  
Friday, September 13, 2024  
1:07 p.m.

1 APPEARANCES :

2

3 On Behalf of the Witness:

4 **Witness Counsel** Henning Strategies

5 **Agency Counsel** General Counsel, U.S. Secret Service

6 **Agency Counsel** Agent Attorney, Office of Chief  
7 Counsel, U.S. Secret Service

8

9 On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

10 **HSGAC Majority** Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel,  
11 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
12 Committee

13 **HSGAC Majority** Deputy Chief Counsel, Senate  
14 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

15

16 On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

17 **HSGAC Minority** Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland  
18 Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

19 **HSGAC Minority** Investigator, Senate Homeland Security  
20 And Governmental Affairs Committee

21 **HSGAC Minority** Staff Director, Senate Homeland  
22 Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

23

24

25

1 APPEARANCES (continued):

2

3 On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

4 [PSI Majority] Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee  
5 on Investigations

6

7 On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

8 [PSI Minority] Staff Director,  
9 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

10 [PSI Minority] Deputy Staff Director,  
11 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

12

13 EXHIBITS:

- 14 1) Unclassified Instruction by Chairman of The Joint
- 15 Chiefs of Staff Related to Sharing of Information 55
- 16 2) United States Secret Service's Mission Support
- 17 Statement, Protective Intelligence 70
- 18 3) Washington Post Article dated July 30th, 2024 92

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

## P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 HSGAC Majority Okay. Good morning. This is a transcribed  
3 interview of U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Special Agent  
4 being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland  
5 Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent  
6 Subcommittee on Investigations.

7 This interview was requested by Committee Chairman  
8 Gary Peters, Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as  
9 Subcommittee Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member  
10 Ron Johnson. This is a part of the Committee's  
11 investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt  
12 on former President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service  
13 planning in advance of and response related to the events  
14 in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13th, 2024.

15 On July 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters, Blumenthal, and  
16 Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested a voluntary  
17 transcribed interview with U.S. Secret Service personnel,  
18 including Witness could you please state  
19 your name and title for the record?

20 Witness Yeah. Witness Assistant Director,  
21 Protective Operations.

22 HSGAC Majority I'll now ask, Witness if your counsel  
23 can introduce themselves?

24 MR. Witness Counsel My name is PII I work for the  
25 law firm of PII Strategies.

1 MR. [Agency Counsel] Good afternoon. [Agency Counsel] H-U-S-E,  
2 Secret Service Chief Counsel.

3 MR. [Agency Counsel] [Agency Counsel] Agent Attorney for the  
4 Office of the Chief Counsel of the United States Secret  
5 Service.

6 [HSGAC Majority] This office, this interview is being  
7 conducted by four offices, and we will now introduce staff  
8 for each of the offices. My name, again, [HSGAC Majority] I'm  
9 the Chief Counsel and Chief Investigative Counsel for the  
10 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,  
11 Majority staff. And I'm joined by my colleague, [HSGAC Majority]  
12 [HSGAC Majority] Deputy General Counsel for the Majority Staff.

13 [HSGAC Minority] Afternoon. My name is [HSGAC Minority]  
14 [HSGAC Minority] joined by my colleague [HSGAC Minority] and then my  
15 colleague William Hendeson.

16 [PSI Majority] My name is [PSI Majority] I am  
17 Senior Counsel with PSI Chair, Richard Blumenthal.

18 [PSI Minority] Good afternoon. [PSI Minority] I'm  
19 with Ranking Member Office on the Permanent Subcommittee on  
20 Investigations. I'm the Deputy Staff Director. I'm joined  
21 by [PSI Minority] the Staff Director.

22 [HSGAC Majority] During today's interview, the reporter will  
23 create a verbatim record of what we discuss. With that in  
24 mind, as I'm sure you're familiar, please respond to  
25 questions verbally because the reporter will not be able to

1 record nonverbal responses. Do you understand?

2 **Witness** Yes, I do.

3 **HSGAC Majority** This interview is going to be unclassified.  
4 So, if any question during today's interview calls for  
5 information that you know to implicate classified  
6 information, please state for the record the implication as  
7 well as the reason you understand the information to be  
8 classified. Once you have clarified to the extent  
9 possible, please respond with as much unclassified  
10 information as you are able to provide in this setting. If  
11 a need arises to have a classified session in one form or  
12 another, we will arrange for that to happen at a later  
13 date. Do you understand?

14 **Witness** Yes, I do.

15 **HSGAC Majority** It is the committee's practice to honor  
16 valid common law privileges and claims as an accommodation  
17 to a witness when those claims are made in good faith and  
18 accompanied by sufficient explanation so that the committee  
19 can evaluate the claim. When deciding, however, whether to  
20 honor the privilege, the committee will weigh its need for  
21 the information against legitimate basis for withholding  
22 it. The interview today is occurring without prejudice to  
23 any future discussions of the committee, and we reserve the  
24 right to request your participation at a later date, should  
25 we need to do so.

1           If you need to take a break at any time other than  
2 breaks, we will plan at the end of each hour. Please let  
3 us know and we'll be happy to accommodate. If you have any  
4 questions about what we're asking, or if a question we ask  
5 is compound or confusing, please state so, and we will be  
6 happy to clarify the question. You are required to answer  
7 questions before Congress truthfully. Do you understand?

8           **Witness**           Yes, I do.

9           **HSGAC Majority**   This also applies to questions posed by  
10 congressional staff in interviews. And, specifically, 18  
11 U.S.C. Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially  
12 false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or  
13 representations in the course of a congressional  
14 investigation. And this statute applies to your statements  
15 in today's interview. Do you understand?

16          **Witness**           Yes, I do.

17          **HSGAC Majority**   Is there any reason that you are not able  
18 to provide us today with any with truthful answers to any  
19 questions?

20          **Witness**           No, there isn't.

21          **HSGAC Majority**   We would ask that you not speak about what  
22 we discuss in this interview with anyone outside of who is  
23 in the room today in order to preserve the integrity of our  
24 investigation. And we would also ask that you not remove  
25 or make copies of photographs or exhibits today that you'll



1 be shown. Do you understand?

2 **Witness** Yes, sir.

3 **HSGAC Majority** We'll provide your counsel with a copy of  
4 the transcript and an errata expeditiously following this  
5 interview, and we'll make those arrangements to provide  
6 that electronically. Before we begin, do you or your  
7 counsel have any questions, or statements, and actually  
8 offer -- sorry, at this moment, I'll just ask if you have  
9 any questions about what I've gone over.

10 **Witness** I don't have any questions, sir.

11 **HSGAC Majority** And at this moment, I'll turn it over to  
12 counsel.

13 MR. **Agency Counsel** Good afternoon. The Secret Service and the  
14 Department of Homeland Security have made available to the  
15 committee, consistent with requests from the chairman,  
16 information and records that would not be publicly  
17 released. This includes information and records covered  
18 under the Privacy Act, personnel, and other personal  
19 privacy information, For Official Use Only intelligence,  
20 and law enforcement-sensitive records and raw intelligence  
21 information.

22 While the Secret Service and the Department of  
23 Homeland Security have made this information and these  
24 records available to the committee, we continue to assert  
25 that such information, any disclosure of such information,

1 is not intended for public disclosure. The Secret Service  
2 and the Department of Homeland Security are not waiving any  
3 protections.

4 And for the purposes of administrative efficiency and  
5 to promote constructive dialogue during this transcribed  
6 interview, we are making this assertion at the outset of  
7 the interview to preserve all assertions of protection from  
8 public release or disclosure over those records, or  
9 information or discussions of same during the transcribed  
10 interview. The transcript and any attachments are  
11 protected from dissemination to the same extent as the  
12 documents and information they are based on.

13 Please consult with the Secret Service and the U.S.  
14 Department of Homeland Security prior to any public release  
15 or disclosure. The Secret Service and the Department have  
16 not consented to, and were assured there would not be any  
17 audio or video recordings of this interview, save the court  
18 reporters recording. The agencies understand that the  
19 interview will be transcribed by a court reporter. Thank  
20 you.

21 **HSGAC Majority** And our understanding as well is that there  
22 will be no recordings outside of those made by the court  
23 reporter today. With respect to any information provided  
24 by the Secret Service, the Senate will be bound only by  
25 Senate rules and will not enter into agreements beyond

1 those rules. The committee does intend to issue a public  
2 report based on its investigation, and that public report  
3 will rely on information both learned from the Secret  
4 Service productions, as well as the interview today.

5 As is the committee's practice, the committee will  
6 provide in advance of its public report, relevant excerpts  
7 that it intends to rely on from the information learned  
8 today and in its investigation in advance of publication of  
9 that report. With respect to the documents themselves that  
10 have been provided in redacted form and the accommodations  
11 that remains a continuing discussion between the committee  
12 and the Secret Service, the committee sent a letter on July  
13 11th raising these concerns to the Acting Director of the  
14 Secret Service, Acting Director Rowe.

15 That same day, the Department of Homeland Security  
16 responded, making its own assertions, and this matter  
17 remains unresolved on September 12<sup>th</sup>. The members  
18 themselves raised these concerns again to Acting Director  
19 Rowe himself.

20 With that, we will begin the interview. And before we  
21 do begin with our questions, I will ask **Witness** if there  
22 are any statements you would like to begin with.

23 MR. **Witness Counsel** Can I just make one -- can I ask one  
24 question for you?

25 **HSGAC Majority** Go ahead.

1 MR. [Witness Counsel] With regard to the transcript and the  
2 errata, is that something that the witness or I can keep a  
3 copy of, or does it need to be returned?

4 [HSGAC Majority] You will not be able to keep a copy because  
5 it will remain a record of the committee, and it will be  
6 provided to you in an electronic reading room. So, you'll  
7 have access to that during the duration of your review.  
8 And then if there are corrections to be made, you can send  
9 to us.

10 MR. [Witness Counsel] Understood. Thank you.

11 [Witness] Good afternoon, everyone. Appreciate the  
12 opportunity to speak here today. I have worked for the  
13 Secret Service since 1997. My current portfolio is the  
14 Assistant Director over the Office of Protective  
15 Operations. It is a large portfolio national and  
16 transnational in scope at times. I manage a chain of  
17 command. There are three deputy assistant directors, and a  
18 deputy chief under me, and then the chief of the Uniformed  
19 Division.

20 The 11 protective divisions fall under this chain of  
21 the Secret Service. One of those protective divisions is  
22 the Uniformed Division, which is an approximately 1,400-  
23 person uniformed police department. They are responsible  
24 for the White House, the Vice President's residence, the  
25 888 diplomatic locations here in Washington, DC. Then

1 there are the remaining protective divisions.

2 Obviously, you're familiar with the President's  
3 detail, the Donald Trump detail, the Vice President's  
4 detail. The other former details that fall underneath  
5 that. They are split amongst the three deputy assistant  
6 directors. They each have a portfolio. The deputy chief,  
7 you know, manages the budgetary side of the House along  
8 with a special projects team and deals with administrative  
9 taskings that support the directorate.

10 There is always a robust tempo. It's a 24/7, 365-  
11 mission. We had approximately over 5,000 protective visits  
12 last year. Equates to approximately 400 trips a month,  
13 approximately 100 protective visits a week. And I guess we  
14 could do the math and say 30 protective visits a day.  
15 Obviously, what happened at Butler was a tragedy. Tragedy.  
16 We're all working diligently to ensure solutions for the  
17 future. And I appreciate the time today.

18 **PSI Majority** Thank you again for coming in today,

19 **Witness** I'd like to just start high level, discuss your  
20 background. Where did you go to school?

21 **Witness** As far as college?

22 **PSI Majority** College. Yeah.

23 **Witness** Yeah. I went to Providence College.

24 **PSI Majority** And then when you get out, did you go  
25 to either military or law enforcement from there?

1           **Witness**            Briefly worked in the investment banking  
2 arena shortly after college, and then got on with the  
3 Secret Service as a Uniformed Division officer.

4           **PSI Majority**        That's an interesting -- so, because I  
5 know that Secret Service has dual role, did you ever spend  
6 any time in the investigative arm?

7           **Witness**            Yes. Well, started off as a Uniformed  
8 Division officer spent some time as a Uniformed Division  
9 officer, then applied to be an agent. Started off in the  
10 New York Field Office. And when you're in your first phase  
11 of your career, you start in a field office, and then you  
12 will work protection and investigations as well.

13          **PSI Majority**        And what, I guess, encouraged you to  
14 make a move to the Secret Service out of investment  
15 banking?

16          **Witness**            Well, I actually interned with the Secret  
17 Service in college. It was always an aspiration of mine to  
18 join the Secret Service since I was probably a kid, and it  
19 was always something I wanted to do.

20          **PSI Majority**        So, you said you worked in district  
21 office. Could you just kind of detail your various roles  
22 to where you're at today? I'm sure there's been many,  
23 because as I understand, you've been there since you were  
24 23 --

25          **Witness**            Yeah.

1           **PSI Majority**           -- 24. But, just, if you could give  
2 us summary of the different roles you've worked on your way  
3 up?

4           **Witness**            Sure. Do you want me to just work through  
5 it?

6           **PSI Majority**           Yeah.

7           **Witness**            Okay. After the New York Field Office, I  
8 went to the President's detail. I was assigned to the  
9 President's detail for about five years.

10          **PSI Majority**           Which President?

11          **Witness**            President Bush.

12          **PSI Majority**           Okay.

13          **Witness**            After the President's detail, then I went  
14 to headquarters. Went to the Criminal Investigative  
15 Division, was there for a couple years. Then after that,  
16 was promoted into management. At that time, went into  
17 something called the Administrative Operations Division.  
18 Spent some time there. And then after that, did a lateral  
19 assignment at the managerial level back to the Criminal  
20 Investigative Division.

21           Then after that, I went to the Dignitary Protective  
22 Division, which is a different protective division. I was  
23 a deputy coordinator for the Democratic National Convention  
24 between 2015 and 2016. After that, went back to the  
25 Criminal Investigative Division, spent some time there,

1 raised through a couple of the ranks, ultimately becoming  
2 the special agent in charge of that division.

3 In about February of 2000, end of February of 2020, at  
4 this point, went and became the special agent in charge of  
5 the Dignitary Protective Division. The Dignitary  
6 Protective Division runs the campaign major events,  
7 National Special Security Events. Did that through  
8 probably May of 2021. Then, went to the Office of  
9 Protective Operations as a deputy assistant director, and  
10 then ultimately, was appointed as the assistant director at  
11 the end of October of 2022.

12 **PSI Majority** And that's your current role?

13 **Witness** Yes, sir.

14 **PSI Majority** Okay. So, is it correct that you lead  
15 the Office of Protective Operations?

16 **Witness** Yes.

17 **PSI Majority** -- as of today, not necessarily -- and  
18 just high level, it sounds like you've done a lot of things  
19 for the Secret Service. But OPO, can you just, high level,  
20 what does OPO do?

21 **Witness** At a high level, I mean, the Office of  
22 Protective Operations plans, instruments, implements,  
23 directs policies, programs, and directives for the 11  
24 protective divisions that fall underneath its purview. It  
25 has a special project section that'll take on taskings and



1 interface cross directorate with the other directorates  
2 within the organization. There's, obviously, the staffing  
3 component to the sustainment of the details. It'll provide  
4 budgetary support and guidance to the protective details,  
5 things of that nature.

6 **PSI Majority** So, it sounds like a pretty central  
7 part of the organization. What is its role in approving or  
8 denying assets or resources for protective events?

9 **Witness** Well, as the assistant director of the  
10 Office of Protective Operations, obviously, I'm not  
11 involved in the, you know, day-to-day decisions of  
12 approving and denying assets. And I would note the advance  
13 process is something that's taking place on the ground with  
14 those respective advance teams making those decisions in  
15 regards to their requirements. And ultimately, where it  
16 comes back to headquarters is there will be supplementation  
17 of personnel required, temporary assignment of personnel,  
18 and special teams' resources to some of those respective  
19 advance teams.

20 **PSI Majority** Because a number of the agents we've  
21 had the opportunity to talk to, you know, we'll ask them --  
22 you know, they'll mention a concern that they had, or maybe  
23 they wanted a certain unit or a certain piece of equipment.  
24 And we'll ask, who did you make that -- resort that request  
25 to? And it seems like it works up the chain through

1 different organizations. So, at what point would it reach  
2 the OPO? I understand you may not look at it personally,  
3 but at what point does that reach the office of OPO, and  
4 somebody looks at that request and makes a decision on it?

5 **Witness** Well, the Staffing and Logistics Office,  
6 and the Office of Protective Operations, their focus really  
7 is post standards and the Uniformed Division magnetometer  
8 report. These officers that provide the magnetometer  
9 report at these sites. You know, as far as our specialized  
10 teams' resources, those requests will come into the War  
11 Room. The War Room will facilitate those requests with the  
12 respective Special Operations Division or section in  
13 regards to those particular assets. And then based on  
14 their feedback and input in regards to availability,  
15 they'll communicate that back to the Staffing and Logistics  
16 Office, and back to that respective detail's operations  
17 desk.

18 **PSI Majority** And when you say War Room, just as  
19 somebody's new to a lot of this, does each event have a War  
20 Room? Is that something inside of OPO?

21 **Witness** The War Room is a moniker that probably  
22 adds more gratis to the standing of the Staffing and  
23 Logistics Office than it should have. It's a shared  
24 partnership between the Office of Protective Operations and  
25 the Office of Investigations.

1           And I should have probably noted earlier, it may sound  
2 a little counterintuitive, but the Office of Protective  
3 Operations it's a shared responsibility. It's supported by  
4 the Office of Investigations, the Strategic Intelligence  
5 and Information Directorate, the Office of Technology  
6 Development, because obviously, OPO doesn't have ownership  
7 over all the assets and all the personnel that ultimately  
8 support the protective operation.

9           And we have a network of field offices that fall under  
10 the Office of Investigations. But, again, that could be  
11 misleading because, again, that network of field offices is  
12 there to support our protective operations as we  
13 geographically travel around nationally or transnationally  
14 in regards to our protective operations.

15           **PSI Majority**           And so, what is your role at OPO,  
16 generally? I mean, I understand you're the director. But  
17 just functionally, what does that look like, I guess,  
18 standard week?

19           **Witness**           Well, my focus is constantly changing as  
20 the nature of protection is very kinetic, and it is  
21 constantly changing. I mean, as I mentioned, there are 888  
22 diplomatic locations. I can't focus on all of them at  
23 once. But there are times, you know, during the year,  
24 we've certainly had some challenges at the -- for obvious  
25 reasons, at the Israeli Embassy and, you know, my focus may

1 be there. There could -- we've had six National Special  
2 Security Events, which are a whole-of-government events  
3 which require a higher level of involvement in regards to  
4 the planning and resources required. So, naturally, I'll  
5 be more involved in something like that.

6 When there are foreign trips by the President, there's  
7 a longer lead-up time to those kinds of trips. And there  
8 will be a higher level of support footprint required. And  
9 obviously, those are the kind of things that I would be  
10 involved in. And my focus changes based on the evolving  
11 nature of protection on a day-to-day basis.

12 **PSI Majority** And does in your role overseeing those  
13 different events of different levels of -- because you  
14 mentioned something, what was it, 30 a day, something like  
15 that, protective events?

16 **Witness** Approximately.

17 **PSI Majority** You know, I'm assuming some are higher  
18 priority than others. How many of those are you brought  
19 into to consult on or to make -- how many do people direct  
20 your attention to?

21 **Witness** Well, look, the advanced process is  
22 something that's going to be taking place on the ground.  
23 You have a special agent in charge of the detail. You have  
24 a special agent in charge if you're going to a respective  
25 field office location. As that advance process takes

1 place, you're going to have a lead advance working in  
2 collaboration and coordination with the field office  
3 management in regards to the development of their security  
4 plan.

5 I have a portfolio with that as issues rise, if  
6 something was to rise that my occasion, that would be an  
7 anomaly. Ultimately, under that portfolio, DAD may bring  
8 something to my attention. However, you know, an assistant  
9 director or a deputy assistant director should not be  
10 armchair quarterbacking the advanced process from, you  
11 know, 1,000 miles away because that could have disastrous  
12 consequences as well.

13 **PSI Majority** Do request for resources ever come  
14 across your desk? Does it ever work its way up to you?

15 **Witness** Typically, request for resources are  
16 facilitated through the Staffing and Logistics Office. We  
17 have SMEs in that room that evaluate those resources. A  
18 lot of it is just finding efficiencies, you know, not  
19 denying a resource. And again, I don't like the term of  
20 "denying a resource". Again, I view it as --

21 [Technical Issues.]

22 **PSI Majority** I think I'd asked a question about how  
23 often requests for resources come across your desk? So,  
24 you said that you have a subject matter expert who works in  
25 an office to consider different subject matter -- different

1 requests. But I mean, I don't know, I saw on these forms  
2 that some events there's was a form, I think for fighter  
3 jetter support. You know, I think there's like all kinds  
4 of things that can be -- and are there any high-profile  
5 requests that don't get resolved lower down that go to you?

6 **Witness** Well, to answer your question, let me just  
7 back up a little bit and provide this context. Keep in  
8 mind like this -- you know, as I said, there's over 5,000  
9 trips a year. If I was in the weeds on every trip, it  
10 would just not be possible. I do not have the bandwidth  
11 for that. And the nature of my position, or my position of  
12 the DAD is not to be involved in these trip requests,  
13 protective visits that are coming in to the Staffing and  
14 Logistics Office on a daily basis, 24/7, 365. So, I would  
15 say very few, to answer your question.

16 **PSI Majority** And what typically arises to that  
17 level?

18 **Witness** So, just to clarify, you mean what rises  
19 to the level of the assistant director --

20 **PSI Majority** Yes.

21 **Witness** -- or the level of Logistics and Planning  
22 Office?

23 **PSI Majority** Well, my understanding was every  
24 request goes the Logistics and Planning Office, but maybe  
25 I'm wrong about that. Do things get filtered out before

1 they get to the Logistics and Planning Office?

2 **Witness** Ultimately, those requests, if there's a -  
3 - those requests are going to be generated by the advance  
4 team on the ground. If I could give you a garden variety  
5 example of something that would be categorized as something  
6 that wouldn't get approved. For example, if there was a  
7 request for counter snipers support, but the arrival was an  
8 underground arrival, so there were no line-of-sight issues,  
9 that clearly just would be not a practical application of  
10 that asset. And that would be an example. And that would  
11 be a decision that would be made in the War Room and, you  
12 know, not rise to my occasion.

13 And again, also, keep in mind a lot of the staffing  
14 and logistics offices' function is to find efficiencies.  
15 Not necessarily approve and deny, but find efficiencies in  
16 regards to the use of human capital. There could be a site  
17 where you have the ability to leapfrog, let's say, what we  
18 use the term is leapfrog. You have three sites. And if  
19 you have the ability, based on the itinerary or the timing  
20 of the schedule, to leapfrog those post standards where the  
21 first post standards that you're using at the first site,  
22 once that site concludes, have the ability to jump to the  
23 last site. And then therefore, you can reduce the number  
24 in aggregate and find efficiencies like that.

25 **PSI Majority** Real quick. Can we pause? I'm

1 getting cooked. Is there a way to close this?

2 [Pause.]

3 **PSI Majority** I guess the question becomes -- so  
4 that's logistics and planning. I guess the question was,  
5 when does it rise above logistics and planning and require  
6 like a higher level of review where you or maybe somebody  
7 who works for you would get their eyes on it?

8 **Witness** Well, I think it would have to be a non-  
9 traditional request. For example, over the past year, and  
10 you could say this is a resource request, due to the  
11 heightened civil disturbance activity that we've seen down  
12 at the White House. Typically, previously, we would not  
13 shut down Pennsylvania Avenue with anti-scale fencing.  
14 That was something based on discussion with my team and the  
15 Uniformed Division members was an asset that I wanted to be  
16 utilized moving forward. And it was kind of a paradigm  
17 shift in how we've dealt with CDU activity and civil  
18 disturbance type activity down at the White House,  
19 previously.

20 Obviously, there's a funding and cost associated with  
21 that. So, a discussion had to be made if that was a  
22 thoughtful and deliberate decision, and that involved a  
23 higher level of management in regards to that.

24 **PSI Majority** Got it. What is your last day working  
25 for the Secret Service?



1           **Witness**           What's that?

2           **PSI Majority**       What is your last day working for the  
3 Secret Service?

4           **Witness**           I suppose technically tomorrow, but.

5           **PSI Majority**       Tomorrow?

6           **Witness**           Yeah.

7           **PSI Majority**       And when did you first consider  
8 retiring?

9           **PSI Majority**       Well, I've been on the job for almost  
10 27 years. I'm glad you asked me that question because it  
11 seems to have garnered a lot of attention lately. I did  
12 not go back in a time capsule and create my employee on-  
13 entrance date of 9/15/97. I promised my wife I wouldn't do  
14 another UN General Assembly which is at the end of  
15 September. As I said, this is a 24/7, 365 role.

16           As I mentioned earlier, I've been very passionate  
17 about the Secret Service. It was something I wanted to do  
18 since I was a young kid. I lobbied to get an intern  
19 program established when I was in college, which didn't  
20 exist, and interned with the Secret Service when I was in  
21 college. And so, I've always been very passionate about  
22 it.

23           But, you know, I also have to understand the toll it's  
24 taken on my wife and kids, and made an agreement with my  
25 wife that I wouldn't go past my anniversary date.

1           **PSI Majority**           One thing I forgot to ask you. How  
2 many people report to you?

3           **Witness**           In aggregate?

4           **PSI Majority**           In aggregate.

5           **Witness**           Well, there's approximately 1,100 special  
6 agents, about 280 administrator, professional, and  
7 technical personnel, approximately over 200. They call  
8 them TLE, Technical Law Enforcement positions. But  
9 basically, these are limited law enforcement positions that  
10 are in support roles that do resident security, or maybe  
11 they just drive, or something of that nature. Division may  
12 be a little bit higher, but approximately, you could say,  
13 1,400 in total people in the Uniformed Division.

14          **PSI Majority**           And who do you report to?

15          **Witness**           I report -- well, it was Deputy Director  
16 Ronald Rowe. Now, it's Acting Deputy Director **PII**  
17 **PII**

18          **PSI Majority**           So, are you one level to two levels  
19 down from Acting Director Rowe now?

20          **Witness**           Yes.

21          **PSI Majority**           When did you learn about the attempted  
22 assassination?

23          **Witness**           When did I learn about it?

24          **PSI Majority**           Mm-hmm.

25          **Witness**           I believe -- well, I was out at the RNC

1 doing walkthroughs with my team. A good example to your  
2 earlier question of things where I may have more direct  
3 involvement in -- that day I was out at the RNC doing  
4 walkthroughs of all the sites with my team. I either was  
5 still walking around with them or had just gotten back to  
6 my hotel. I can't recall exactly. But I received -- my  
7 deputy assistant director whose portfolio the Donald Trump  
8 detail falls under called me. She had just received a call  
9 a couple minutes after this incident happened from the  
10 deputy special agent in charge of the detail. And  
11 contemporaneously, I received a call from Deputy Director  
12 Rowe around that time. So, that was probably 6:18, 6:20  
13 maybe around there.

14 Then, shortly after that our -- what we call our POC  
15 alerts, our Protective Intelligence Operations Center  
16 alerts, that provide notifications and information. That  
17 flow of information started. And at that point I told my  
18 deputy assistant director, "Okay, well, let's meet in the  
19 lobby of the hotel and we're going to go back to the  
20 coordinating center. When you have a National Special  
21 Security Event like the RNC or the DNC, you have a  
22 coordinating center established, which is essentially the  
23 office space where everybody works out of. And we went to  
24 the coordinating center.

25 **PSI Majority** So, essentially, you found out about

1 it almost immediately after?

2 **Witness** Yes, that's correct.

3 **PSI Majority** Okay. And have you spoken to the  
4 internal review that the Secret Service is conducting on  
5 the matter?

6 MR. **Witness Counsel** Sorry, just to clarify. When you say  
7 the internal review, is that the Mission Assurance Review?

8 **PSI Majority** The Mission Assurance.

9 MR. **Witness Counsel** Thanks.

10 **Witness** Yes. I've spoken to the Mission Assurance  
11 team that's conducting the investigation.

12 **PSI Majority** And you said that Deputy Director  
13 Rowe, at the time, called you to speak about it. Did you  
14 guys speak about it in the subsequent days and weeks to  
15 kind of try to figure out what went wrong?

16 **Witness** Well, yes. He was back in Washington, DC,  
17 at that time, but I believe the following day he flew out.  
18 But yes, we were on the phone. Well, at that point, we  
19 were all communicating. The executive leadership team was  
20 communicating, I would say, in constant communication  
21 regarding the matter and trying to ingest information and  
22 address the matter at hand.

23 **PSI Majority** And was he concerned about what had  
24 happened?

25 **Witness** What's that?

1           **PSI Majority**           Was he concerned? Was he concerned  
2 about what had happened?

3           **Witness**           Yes, obviously, he was. We were all  
4 extremely concerned and upset.

5           **PSI Majority**           What date did you send your  
6 resignation in?

7           **Witness**           What date did I -- I gave notice to the  
8 deputy director in August. I had a conversation with him  
9 about it, and let him know probably five, six weeks in  
10 advance.

11          **PSI Majority**          Well, because I guess you'd said you  
12 considered retiring before that date. My dad is in his  
13 late 60s and he's been considering retiring for -- every  
14 year he tells us next year. Had you considered resigning  
15 before this date?

16          **Witness**           Had I considered resigning?

17          **PSI Majority**          Well, or retiring?

18          **Witness**           Retiring. I stayed on two years after my  
19 retirement. As I indicated earlier, I kind of projected my  
20 anniversary date as my hard stop because knowing my  
21 personality, I probably would've kept going. So, I kind of  
22 used that as a benchmark.

23          **PSI Majority**          Did anybody encourage you to retire  
24 earlier?

25          **Witness**           No. In fact, I'm glad I'm in this

1 setting. I have an opportunity to address that as well.  
2 No one encouraged me to retire. I think the deputy  
3 director was surprised, but I don't think -- but no, to  
4 answer your question. Nobody encouraged me to retire.  
5 This was my decision. I said this was something that I  
6 made a promise to the wife a long time ago, and it was  
7 time.

8 **PSI Majority** So, did July 13th have any impact one  
9 way or another on your decision?

10 **Witness** No. In fact, as a result of July 13th, I  
11 stayed a little bit longer than I intended for an orderly  
12 transition.

13 **PSI Majority** When did you first hear about the July  
14 13th Butler rally? Did you know about it before the event?

15 **Witness** Yeah. I was aware there was a rally  
16 coming up.

17 **PSI Majority** And when did you first learn about it?

18 **Witness** Well, we have a -- I don't recall exactly  
19 when I learned about it, but we have a protective daily  
20 operations seat that has, you know, a list of projected  
21 visits. And I was aware based on, you know, conversations  
22 with my DAD that we had an outdoor rally coming up.

23 **PSI Majority** And were any of the requests for  
24 resources, assets, or personnel? Were you ever aware of  
25 any of the requests made for that rally?

1 MR. **Witness Counsel** Sorry, for the inquiry? The timeframe?  
2 Were you aware --

3 **PSI Majority** In the days, weeks preceding the  
4 rally.

5 MR. **Witness Counsel** Before the rally. Okay.

6 **Witness** Can you repeat question?

7 **PSI Majority** Were you ever made aware of the  
8 requests that were made for the rally; for equipment  
9 personnel, anything, that was made by the advance team?

10 **Witness** Prior to the visit, no. I was not aware  
11 of the individual requests that were being made by the  
12 advance team.

13 **PSI Majority** So, for instance, there was counter  
14 sniper support. Were you made aware of that there would be  
15 counter sniper support the day of the rally, prior to the  
16 rally?

17 **Witness** In regards to the counter sniper support,  
18 that was something earlier that week, I and my other DDS  
19 had a conversation about. Two of my DADs, one whose  
20 particular portfolio the Donald Trump detail falls under,  
21 the other one, the Special Operations Division falls under.  
22 And we had a conversation where we felt moving forward, we  
23 wanted to authorize our CS support for this visit and  
24 outdoor rallies going forward.

25 **PSI Majority** And why did you make that choice?

1           **Witness**       Based on generalized reporting at the  
2 time, and due to the fact that we felt these outdoor  
3 rallies for a former President were something that we've  
4 never seen a former President do in size, scale, and scope.  
5 On the cusp of being the nominee, it made sense to  
6 authorize our own CS, counter sniper resource, which is  
7 uncharacteristic due to the finite nature of the amount of  
8 counter snipers that we have.

9           MR. **Witness Counsel**   And just to comply with the request that  
10 **HSGAC Majority** gave at the beginning, the -- sorry, can you hear  
11 me now? All right. Just to comply with the request that  
12 **HSGAC Majority** gave at the beginning, the question starts to  
13 touch on the areas that **Witness** has to remain cognizant  
14 of regarding confidential and classified information. And  
15 I'm just flagging it because you asked this to identify  
16 that location.

17          **PSI Majority**       Can you tell -- you mean the prior  
18 answer was classified, or?

19          MR. **Witness Counsel**   No, no, I apologize. The inquiry. The  
20 question asked about -- I think it was why did you make  
21 that decision? And he said based on certain information.  
22 If you want to go further than the certain information, I  
23 just want to flag that this is one of the topic areas that  
24 **HSGAC Majority** asked us to identify that if there's going to be  
25 classified information discussed. For instance, if you



1 said what was that information? I just want to make --  
2 because if he has to do that.

3 **PSI Majority** So, my understanding, just to clarify,  
4 is you're saying the unprecedented nature of the rallies  
5 generalized reporting, which I assume is a reference to the  
6 reporting about Iranian threat, although maybe that might  
7 be an assumption, and there's another body that's  
8 classified that we would need to go.

9 MR. **Witness Counsel** No. I'm not providing an answer for the  
10 witness, to be clear. What I'm saying is that the  
11 generalized reporting that the witness is referring to  
12 includes certain information that might start to get into  
13 the warning that **HSGAC Majority** gave. I'm only doing it because  
14 you asked us to identify in advance.

15 **HSGAC Majority** I'll ask a clarifying question and then we  
16 can follow-up in another setting if need be. The first  
17 clarifying question, did any of the information you relied  
18 on to make this decision involve publicly available  
19 information, including public reporting in the news?

20 **Witness** Well, let me answer that question this  
21 way. I think some of this reporting at this point is now  
22 in the news. However, based in aggregate on the  
23 information that we were seeing at the time, I will say  
24 this, we were not in possession of any specific adverse  
25 intelligence to Butler. However, again, I guess, I would

1 rely on intelligence informs operations, but it doesn't  
2 necessarily dictate operations. And based on the totality  
3 of circumstances, we felt at this point being as close as  
4 he was to being, which we assumed, the nominee, that this  
5 was a prudent decision.

6 **HSGAC Majority** Two more clarifying questions then I'll  
7 turn it over. With respect to information you may or may  
8 not have relied on that involves intelligence, will  
9 questions related to that intelligence implicate classified  
10 information that you cannot discuss in this setting?

11 MR. **Agency Counsel** Forgive me. And I think you did just  
12 clarify it. In the Secret Service there is law  
13 enforcement-sensitive, non-classified intelligence. I  
14 assumed from your question you're referring to classified  
15 intelligence.

16 **HSGAC Majority** Correct.

17 MR. **Agency Counsel** Thank you.

18 **Witness** So, can you repeat your question again?

19 **HSGAC Majority** Did any of the -- to the extent you relied  
20 on information implicating intelligence, was that  
21 intelligence information that is classified and that cannot  
22 be discussed in this setting?

23 **Witness** Yes. It would be classified, and it  
24 couldn't be discussed in this setting.

25 **HSGAC Majority** Last clarifying question, and then I'll

1 turn it over. In prior testimony, including by the lead  
2 advance agent for the Butler rally, that agent has told the  
3 committee that she was notified on July 9th that based on  
4 credible intelligence, counter sniper teams from the Secret  
5 Service would be provided. Is the question I have asked  
6 directly related to the information that was relayed to the  
7 lead agent on July 9th, to the extent you know the answer  
8 to that question?

9 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of what  
10 was relayed to the lead advance agent. So, I don't have an  
11 answer to that question.

12 **HSGAC Majority** Okay. Back to you.

13 **PSI Majority** Okay. So, you to discuss the counter  
14 sniper support before the rally. Were there any other  
15 requests, you know, drone support surveillance, any other  
16 requests, or resources, or assets that you were involved in  
17 discussing prior to the rally?

18 **Witness** In regards to other resources related to  
19 the rally, no. Those were not discussed with me in regards  
20 to other resources for the rally.

21 **PSI Majority** And did you ever have communication  
22 with the campaign to discuss the rally?

23 **Witness** Can you clarify when you say the campaign?

24 **PSI Majority** The Trump campaign, the organization?

25 **Witness** Yeah. I've never -- I don't interact with

1 the Trump campaign. That would be something that the  
2 detail and the SAIC, Special Agent in Charge, and the  
3 Donald Trump detail operations desk, they interact with  
4 their staff. The Trip Tic Director would likely feed them,  
5 you know, pending trips information, stuff of that nature.  
6 That's how that works in the Office of Protective  
7 Operations. We're not interacting with the campaign staff.

8 **PSI Majority** Okay. One last question, then I'll  
9 turn to my colleague. I think one of the things that we've  
10 been trying to keep track of during this process is  
11 understanding who is responsible for what. And it seems  
12 like a number of times we've asked agents; who is  
13 responsible for that perimeter? Who's responsible for that  
14 line of sight? Who's responsible for making sure this  
15 machine is operational? And they'll say, well, we looked  
16 at it and we sent it to an office, and they sent it to an  
17 office. And then it went here, and then it went there.

18 And so maybe you can help us understand a big picture  
19 who -- and for instance, let's just use the Butler rally  
20 because that's what we're most familiar with. Who is the  
21 person responsible? Is there a quarterback to this rally?  
22 Is there a head coach? And it's like, that's the person  
23 that has the final sign off. Because we've heard, you  
24 know, it's a consensus, but it's just been a little bit  
25 hard to track who the final signature is on these things.

1           **Witness**           Well, during the advance process, the lead  
2 advance in the field office, supervisor, or his proxy, is  
3 responsible for developing the security plan during the  
4 advance week that is memorialized in the manual. The  
5 manpower for the visit, staffing for the visit, is  
6 typically due two days, two business days prior to the  
7 actual visit. The field management and the lead advance  
8 are there all week. They're interfacing with their local  
9 police counterparts.

10           As I stated earlier, the reason why we have a network  
11 of field offices is -- and it does sound counterintuitive,  
12 but that advance team, regardless if it is Butler or not,  
13 will typically be staffed by the field office personnel, in  
14 particular the lead advance. But it's that advance team  
15 that comes up with the security plan and creates the  
16 security plan for that visit.

17           **PSI Majority**           **HSGAC Majority**

18           **HSGAC Majority**       A few follow-up questions. And just for  
19 timing purposes, we'll break in about 10 to 15 minutes. On  
20 the date of the rally, July 13th, in Butler, am I correct  
21 you were in Milwaukee?

22           **Witness**           Yes, sir. That's correct.

23           **HSGAC Majority**       And our understanding is that the Secret  
24 Service first became aware of and began planning for the  
25 July 13th rally as early as July 3rd. Is that something

1 you're aware of?

2 **Witness** My understanding, from what I've seen  
3 after the fact, I believe the field office was notified of  
4 a visit coming to Pittsburgh. The visit was confirmed, to  
5 my knowledge, on the 5th as being the Butler Farm Show.  
6 That's what I recollect.

7 **HSGAC Majority** So, you personally became aware of the July  
8 13th rally plan on July 5th. Is that correct?

9 **Witness** No. I didn't become personally aware of  
10 it. That was after the fact --

11 **HSGAC Majority** I see.

12 **Witness** -- after I looked at some documentation,

13 **HSGAC Majority** So, not referring to any after-the-fact  
14 recollections you may have, as you sit here now, are you  
15 able to say if you were aware of the July 13th rally  
16 happening in Butler any time before the 13th? And if so,  
17 when were you first aware?

18 **MR. Witness Counsel** Sorry. Just to clarify, the first part  
19 of the question was if he can confirm, as he sits there,  
20 whether he knew about the rally prior to --

21 **HSGAC Majority** Yes.

22 **MR. Witness Counsel** -- July 13th or 5th?

23 **HSGAC Majority** 13th.

24 **MR. Witness Counsel** Okay.

25 **Witness** Well, I must have been aware of it prior

1 to the 9th. As I mentioned, we had our CS resource travel  
2 up the 9th.

3 **HSGAC Majority** So, to the best, you're able to recollect  
4 now, as early as July 9th or immediately prior to the July  
5 9th would've been the first date you're able to say you  
6 were aware of the Butler rally plan for the 13th. Is that  
7 correct?

8 **Witness** Yeah. Approximately, somewhere in the  
9 first week of July.

10 **HSGAC Majority** And then, given your testimony earlier  
11 about the number of events that are happening in a given  
12 year, and broken down in a given day and week, are you  
13 aware now, thinking back to that period of time between  
14 July 3rd and July 13th, in that 10-day period; one, are you  
15 aware of approximately how many different events would have  
16 been occurring during that 10-day period? And if so, can  
17 you share how many?

18 **Witness** I couldn't speak with off the top of my  
19 head with granularity how many specific events were  
20 happening during that time period. I will note that was an  
21 extremely busy time period for us. We had the NATO Summit  
22 taking place in DC which was a National Special Security  
23 Event right on the heels of rolling into the RNC. So,  
24 obviously, there was a lot of intention and focus dealing  
25 with the NATO Summit that was taking place in DC. I'm sure

1 you saw also the lay down of our perimeter and its impact  
2 to the city during that week. So, it was a busy time.

3 **HSGAC Majority** We're becoming familiar with the paperwork  
4 involved in each event. My understanding is that this  
5 paperwork is common and for the events you've described  
6 would've occurred there as well. So, I'm not asking with  
7 the assumption that you should have been aware, but just  
8 from my understanding to be clear about the Butler event in  
9 particular, given the context you've just shared of all the  
10 other events going on, and not after the fact.

11 But during the time period in question, prior to July  
12 13th, were you aware of, and had you reviewed one of the  
13 pieces of paperwork for the Butler rally, the Technical  
14 Security Division Outdoor Site Survey?

15 **Witness** No. Again, as the AD, typically I'm not  
16 reviewing the paperwork of the particular advances. And I  
17 did not review that document, no.

18 **HSGAC Majority** And same question, specific to Butler.  
19 Prior to July 13th, were you aware of and did you ever  
20 review the preliminary survey?

21 **Witness** The preliminary survey? No. That  
22 preliminary survey is something that's created by the lead  
23 advance agent. It is approved by the local field office  
24 supervisor, and reviewed, and approved by that respective  
25 Donald Trump detail operations desk.



1           **HSGAC Majority**   Then I want to ask a specific set of  
2 questions about a number of resources we have learned about  
3 to understand whether like the counter sniper team that  
4 ever rose to your level of discussion. The first is, and  
5 again, only with respect to the period of July 13th and  
6 prior, not any subsequent recollection you may have prior  
7 to July 13th, were you ever made aware of any discussions  
8 about the utility of or need for a counter surveillance  
9 unit for the Butler rally?

10          **Witness**           No. That was not discussed with me.

11          **HSGAC Majority**   And same question with respect to a CAT  
12 liaison.

13          **Witness**           At that time, the Donald Trump detail had  
14 counterassault assigned to it already. But no, a CAT LNO,  
15 no, that was not brought to my attention.

16          **HSGAC Majority**   And same question with respect to  
17 additional magnetometers to be used at the Butler rally.

18          **Witness**           Additional magnetometers to be used prior?  
19 No, I was not -- that was not brought to my attention.

20          **HSGAC Majority**   Last question in this line, any additional  
21 requests for Secret Service personnel

22          **Witness**           Can you qualify that?

23          **HSGAC Majority**   So, prior to the July 13th rally, were any  
24 requests for U.S. Secret Service personnel to be used at  
25 the July 13th rally made that rose up to your level?

1           **Witness**           And again, that's a decision-making  
2 process that should take place during the advance process.  
3 No one from the Staffing and Logistics Office brought to my  
4 attention nor from the Donald Trump detail that there was a  
5 lack of personnel resources. My DAD whose portfolio that  
6 falls under did not have that kind of interaction or  
7 conversation with anybody in regards to resources.

8           **HSGAC Majority**   And last question for me, and I'll turn to  
9 my colleague. With respect to the decision made about  
10 counter sniper support, who ultimately made the decision to  
11 authorize that support? Is that you or somebody else?

12          **Witness**           Well, based on the discussion that I had  
13 collectively with two of my deputy assistant directors, we  
14 had a conversation, felt it was the right decision to make  
15 and a logical decision to make. And it was a collective  
16 agreement, and that was how the decision took place.

17          **HSGAC Majority**   And who communicated that decision from the  
18 group you just described, and who did they communicate it  
19 to?

20          **Witness**           My understanding is the deputy assistant  
21 director that has the Special Operations Division under him  
22 communicated with the SAIC of the Special Operations  
23 Division and said, you know, moving forward we're going to  
24 leverage our own CS for these outdoor rallies.

25          **HSGAC Majority**   And who are those two people, just for our

1 understanding? What are the names?

2 **Witness** Deputy Assistant Director **Dep. Asst. Dir Protective Ops**, and  
3 Special Agent in Charge, **ASAIC Special Ops**. And that's, again,  
4 my understanding of how the message was passed.

5 **HSGAC Majority** And if you don't know, that's fine. But  
6 to the extent you know, who then communicated that  
7 information to the Secret Service officials involved. And  
8 I know there are many in the Butler preparations. And when  
9 was that decision communicated?

10 **Witness** Well, I don't have personal knowledge of  
11 that, but -- I don't have personal knowledge of how that  
12 was communicated.

13 **HSGAC Majority** Hi. Just a couple of quick follow-up  
14 questions. This is **HSGAC Majority** with Senator Peters as  
15 well. Just to one more question on the counter sniper  
16 support authorization. And again, understanding, you know,  
17 I'm not asking you to talk about the specific intelligence,  
18 but you said you had this conversation with two of your  
19 deputy assistant directors.

20 Who first raised the either idea or request for  
21 counter sniper support? I guess that first question would  
22 be, was it something that was requested and then discussed,  
23 or was the idea of sending counter snipers something that  
24 was generated amongst the three of you at this discussion?

25 **Witness** Yeah. I understand your question, and I'm

1 not trying to split hairs on the question. I think just  
2 collectively, all three of us agreed that this was the  
3 right decision to make. So, we're -- I guess you could say  
4 we had a unity of thought on the decision.

5 **HSGAC Majority** And so just to be clear, there wasn't  
6 any -- and I may be misremembering, but I thought I  
7 recalled that we had heard in a previous interview that a  
8 request had been made either by somebody in the Donald  
9 Trump detail or elsewhere affirmatively for counter sniper  
10 support. Is that inaccurate?

11 **MR. Witness Counsel** Just for clarification, are you asking  
12 if there was a singular way that this was done? Because I  
13 believe what you're getting into is the discussion that [REDACTED]  
14 **Witness** had separate from a request that was made.

15 **HSGAC Majority** So, I just don't understand if there was  
16 a request that precipitated that discussion, or if the  
17 decision, the idea to send counter snipers was generated in  
18 discussion of whatever this -- the information that we're  
19 not able to discuss in this setting is.

20 **MR. Witness Counsel** Can I just have one minute to chat with  
21 my client, briefly?

22 [Pause.]

23 **Witness** Okay. I understand your question better.  
24 I guess this is the way I would answer, it would be this,  
25 we had unanimous stance, myself, and my two DDs, that we

1 wanted counter sniper support authorized for this event. I  
2 think there was a contemporaneous request that came into  
3 the Staffing and Logistics Office where we had -- were  
4 already in agreement that it would be authorized. And when  
5 that request was received by the Staffing and Logistics  
6 Office, it was authorized.

7 So, it may not have been communicated directly to the  
8 detail that it was authorized. But my recollection is  
9 earlier on in that week, as I just stated earlier in my  
10 remarks, **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** had had a conversation with the SAIC  
11 of the Special Operations Division, who I believe had a  
12 conversation with the counter sniper leadership and  
13 informed them of this change. Because this was an  
14 uncharacteristic asset to be utilized for a candidate for  
15 the -- in regards to this fashion.

16 **HSGAC Majority** All right. Thank you for that. I think  
17 I understand the distinction you're making --

18 MR. **Witness Counsel** And can I have one moment --

19 **HSGAC Majority** Yes.

20 MR. **Witness Counsel** -- to clarify that question so I  
21 understand. Just to make sure I understand it, was part of  
22 your question inquiring if **Witness** was aware at the time  
23 that a request was made by the Donald Trump detail for CS  
24 because he has that knowledge, as he sits here. But I just  
25 want him to clarify if that's part of your question.

1           **HSGAC Majority**    Yes, yes.

2           MR. **Witness Counsel**    Okay.  So, the question, just so I can  
3 say it to be clear, is at the time of July, I believe, **HSGAC Maj**  
4 **HSGAC Majority** said the 5th through the 13th, at that time, did he  
5 ever become aware that a request for CS had been  
6 specifically made by the Donald Trump detail?  Did that  
7 ever come to his desk?

8           **HSGAC Majority**    Yes.

9           **Witness**            Yeah.  I did not have knowledge during  
10 that timeframe of them making the request for the counter  
11 sniper support.  However, regardless, I wanted the counter  
12 sniper support to be offered for the Donald Trump detail,  
13 and ultimately, wanted my chain to pass that message.  So,  
14 it might have been two ships passing in the night at the  
15 same time in regards to the request.

16          **HSGAC Majority**    Okay.  Understood.  Thank you for the  
17 clarification.  And apologizing, you may have said this  
18 before, but do you, to the best of your recollection, when  
19 did the discussion that you had about authorizing counter  
20 snipers occur?  Do you know if it -- because I know the  
21 counters snippers were authorized on the 9th.  Do you know  
22 if it was the same day, or a day or two prior?

23          **Witness**            I don't recall, specifically, but I  
24 believe, again, had a conversation with the DDs.  They had  
25 to have passed that information prior to the 9th, because

1 my understanding was the SAIC of the Special Operations  
2 Division was notified somewhere around the 5th, so.

3 **HSGAC Majority** Got it. And do you recall if either  
4 before or after that meeting you exchanged any emails with  
5 the DDs or others about the counter sniper authorization?

6 **Witness** No. There was not an exchange of emails.  
7 It was a verbal conversation with two people.

8 **HSGAC Majority** And just jumping to something else,  
9 briefly. Our understanding is that -- and I'm forgetting  
10 the exact timeline in front of me, that some months earlier  
11 I think maybe May, it was that counterassault resources  
12 began to be routinely provided to events for former  
13 President Trump. Is that your understanding?

14 **Witness** Yes. We authorized Counter Assault for  
15 him the beginning of April, which is typically something  
16 that would not be authorized that earlier in the calendar  
17 year. So, we made that change.

18 **HSGAC Majority** And I think you answered my next  
19 questions, which were whether you, your office, or you  
20 directly had a role in approving that, and if so, what the  
21 rationale was for that authorization?

22 **Witness** Well, the rationale for that authorization  
23 is obviously we've never had a former President run for the  
24 office, President. We've had a heightened posture on him,  
25 really, you could say, since he came out of office. And

1 this was just part of that incremental progression of  
2 posturing assets for him in regards to the fact that he was  
3 -- you know, had a higher profile than of obviously an  
4 average former President would have in what we've seen with  
5 other candidates.

6 **HSGAC Majority** Got it. And when that decision was  
7 made, I'm assuming the decision was made in April, if it  
8 was authorized in late April, was there any discussion at  
9 that point about also providing counter snipers to his  
10 events?

11 **Witness** When we made the decision to authorize a  
12 Counter Assault, did we contemplate counter snipers?

13 **HSGAC Majority** Or any other resources that weren't  
14 typically provided to a former President at that point?

15 **Witness** I believe the date, and I hope I'm  
16 correct, I think it was April 7th that we authorized the  
17 Counter Assault. That's when they started being assigned.  
18 But keep in mind, the assets afforded to him were higher,  
19 at least in my experience with the Secret Service, than  
20 we've seen with other candidates. I mean, I don't recall  
21 another former President having the continuous presence of

22 **LES**

23 **LES**. And again, these were all these  
24 steps taken to augment his assets and resources, which  
25 typically would normally not be provided.



1           **HSGAC Majority**   Okay.  So, then did you say that there  
2 was no discussion of counter snipers, that you can recall,  
3 in April when the decision was made to send Counter Assault  
4 Agents or operators?

5           **Witness**           No.  Counter Snipers at that time were not  
6 discussed.

7           **HSGAC Majority**   Got it.  And, again, jumping to --

8           MR. **Witness Counsel**   We're just -- I'm trying to get  
9 clarification.  You're asking if on the specific date,  
10 April 7th, that he used -- or the date of the meeting where  
11 the counterassault team was discussed, if he remembers  
12 during that meeting, if there was a discussion of --

13           **HSGAC Majority**   I guess, I don't know if there's a  
14 specific meeting in whatever discussion or process led to  
15 the decision to authorize counterassault teams going  
16 forward, if at any point during those conversation or  
17 conversations, counter snipers were also raised.

18           **Witness**           Okay.  I understand better.  No.  To  
19 answer your question in short, no.

20           **HSGAC Majority**   Okay.  Thank you very much.  And then  
21 just jumping to one last question on something different  
22 that you had mentioned earlier.  I want to make sure I  
23 heard you right about the preliminary survey.  If I heard  
24 you right, you said that the preliminary survey is a  
25 document that's approved by the local field office

1 supervisor and the detail. Is that correct?

2 **Witness** The preliminary survey, which I assume  
3 you've seen at this point, is essentially a document that  
4 has the basic artifacts of the security plan. It's created  
5 by the lead advance agent and should obviously get -- as it  
6 encapsulates the security plan, is a work product that  
7 should get reviewed and approved by the local field office  
8 management. It's also a document, as I said, is reviewed  
9 and approved by that respective detail's operations  
10 section. Because this is the security planning document.

11 Just, as I said, the biggest challenge we have, these  
12 visits are all geographically displaced. That document is  
13 the document that's going to be used for that respective  
14 detail as a briefing document, and have the opportunity to  
15 you know, essentially have the basic artifacts of the  
16 advance, the visit itinerary, et cetera.

17 **HSGAC Majority** Got it. And just to be absolutely  
18 clear. So, your understanding is that the local field  
19 office supervisor, which for the Butler rally would've been  
20 the Pittsburgh Field Office, had a formal role in approving  
21 the preliminary survey for that event?

22 **Witness** The local field office management should  
23 be reviewing the preliminary survey, and also the Donald  
24 Trump detail operations decks is going to, you know, review  
25 the preliminary survey as well.

1           **HSGAC Majority**   And, you know, during your tenure at the  
2 Secret Service, has that been your understanding? I guess  
3 I'll explain the reason I'm asking this question. We'd  
4 been told at prior interview that there had been a change  
5 at some point in the sort of chain of review for the  
6 preliminary survey. And that it no longer goes through the  
7 field office, but instead goes -- that it used to go  
8 through the field office and now it doesn't. Is that  
9 something that you're familiar with?

10          **Witness**           I'm not exactly sure what you're referring  
11 to. Again, you know, back when I was doing this and the  
12 preliminary survey would get printed out and reviewed by  
13 the field office supervisor. Now, the preliminary survey  
14 is created in a digital application as one would expect the  
15 **LES**                       would streamlines the creation of  
16 the preliminary survey.

17           However, the field office supervisor is ultimately  
18 responsible. Well, the field office supervisor and the  
19 lead advance are conducting the advance all week, are  
20 responsible for the security plan on the ground in whether  
21 they're reviewing the preliminary survey as a mechanism to  
22 do that, or reviewing the security plan based on their  
23 walkthroughs and the advance process has responsibility  
24 over the security plan.

25          **HSGAC Majority**   Okay. Appreciate it. Thank you very

1 much. That's all I have. I think, we'll take a five-  
2 minute break.

3 **HSGAC Majority** Okay. We'll go off the record.

4 [Recess.]

5 **HSGAC Minority** All right. We'll go ahead and go back  
6 on the record. Thank you for being here. My name is

7 **HSGAC Minority** again. And thank you for your service  
8 and for spending the last, I guess, one of the last days of  
9 your time with the Service with us. We appreciate it.

10 I just want to start by saying we're going to go  
11 through a few things. I understand that I'm probably going  
12 to get close to talking about some things that you can't  
13 talk about. I just would ask that you are very clear, and  
14 I might ask you some follow-up questions about, you know,  
15 classification. And to the extent that you can answer  
16 anything, please do.

17 But I just wanted to start with, you said something  
18 earlier. You used this as an example, you said when we  
19 were talking about counter sniper support you used as an  
20 example if an arrival was underground and there were no  
21 line-of-sight concerns, how it might, I guess, not make  
22 sense to approve counter sniper support for that. Is that  
23 correct?

24 **Witness** Yes, that's correct.

25 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And I only asked that because I

1 think it's interesting, I'm sure you are very aware of Lew  
2 Merletti actually recently wrote a book where he's quoted,  
3 and he talks about how arrivals and departures are critical  
4 times in terms of protection. Do you agree with that?

5 **Witness** I don't have the full context of it.

6 **HSGAC Minority** Just generally. He's, you know, -- and  
7 I'm not trying to -- it is just, you know, he talks about  
8 how arrivals and departures are critical periods in  
9 protection, security. And so, I wanted to know when, in  
10 terms of prior to this event or prior to determining to  
11 provide anyone counter sniper support just across the  
12 board, is that something that's considered when determining  
13 whether to provide counter sniper support?

14 **Witness** Well, I think there are a variety of  
15 factors that come in in regards to providing counter sniper  
16 support. You know, mainly, is there a line of sight, and  
17 is there the ability to mitigate that line of sight?  
18 Sometimes we have the ability to take that out of play,  
19 excuse the, you know, parlance, but you know, out of play  
20 via utilizing box trucks, other physical infrastructure.  
21 So, you can mitigate line of sight that way.

22 It may not necessarily require the use of counter  
23 sniper to mitigate line of sight. You know, I guess one  
24 thing, maybe just to educate the group and use this as an  
25 opportunity to talk about our counter sniper resources in

1 general. These are very finite resources. Of course, I  
2 wasn't hired in the Secret Service because I had a  
3 photographic memory, but from what I recall, we have  
4 **LES [REDACTED]**, and then you have  
5 probably a few more that are the supervisors.

6 So, going with that number, you know, to cover the  
7 White House, it's **LES [REDACTED]** If the **LES [REDACTED]** is  
8 contemporaneously **LES [REDACTED]**, that's **LES [REDACTED]**. If  
9 we've got a trip that's out of town, and in and out, that's  
10 another **LES [REDACTED]** And then, if he has what we'd refer to as  
11 a **LES [REDACTED]**  
12 **LES [REDACTED]** your number could **LES [REDACTED]** So, you very  
13 quickly run out of staffing.

14 In regards to our counter sniper unit, it's the only  
15 stand-alone counter sniper unit to my knowledge in the U.S.  
16 government. And again, the challenge of being an elite  
17 unit is you're an elite unit. It's a difficult unit to be  
18 in and recruit the right individual that make that  
19 standard. So, these resources, I guess in my very long-  
20 winded way, I'm trying to explain to you just as a point of  
21 fact, they have to be used very judiciously in regards to  
22 their application.

23 **HSGAC Minority** No, that is very helpful to understand.  
24 And we heard this the same, you know, about the numbers and  
25 the limits of that resource. And so just it was a big deal

1 to determine that going forward. I guess, let me ask this  
2 in a question form. When the determination was made to, I  
3 think you said start providing counter sniper support going  
4 forward for outdoor rallies, was that the decision, or?

5 **Witness** I think the assessment at that point were  
6 for outdoor events. I don't know -- I can't say with  
7 complete transparency if I categorized it as a rally or an  
8 event, but I would think the same calculus would've applied  
9 to an outdoor event even if it wasn't a rally because we  
10 would have the same concerns.

11 **HSGAC Minority** So, it wasn't, you know, 24/7 coverage  
12 or coverage at, you know, residence. It was more an event,  
13 or?

14 **Witness** For larger outdoor events. Again, this  
15 was the next evolution in this overarching incremental,  
16 continuous increase of assets for the former President.  
17 And the first step was focused on outdoor events.

18 **HSGAC Minority** And I understand that this was kind of  
19 first step, but given the limited resources you're working  
20 with in terms of counter sniper support, was that  
21 determination going to be based on available counter sniper  
22 resources at the time? Is that how -- or was it kind of,  
23 like, we're going to do this, I mean?

24 **Witness** Well, essentially, the director was we're  
25 going to do this going forward. Did we have all the

1 answers as to how it was ultimately going to manifest  
2 itself at that time in regards to competing manpower,  
3 staffing requirements? We didn't have all those answers.  
4 But we felt going forward, this was something that needed  
5 to be done.

6 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And I think you mentioned July  
7 5th, SOD was aware --

8 **Witness** To my knowledge, yes.

9 **HSGAC Minority** -- of this? Okay. I'm just going to  
10 try to -- I'd just like to try to kind of pinpoint the  
11 timing if we can. So, this was the first. So, July 13th  
12 was the first event that he had counter sniper support as a  
13 candidate.

14 **Witness** Well, what we had done previously is we  
15 would have oftentimes -- and I can't recall every visit off  
16 the top of my head. I believe last year he had 308 visits,  
17 but they would leverage a CAT LNO based on the nature of  
18 the visit, a CAT liaison, and that CAT liaison would travel  
19 out as part of the advance team and partner with local and  
20 state resources of comparable resources for that counter  
21 sniper support.

22 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, the CAT LNO also interacts  
23 with potential counter sniper resource, local, if they're -  
24 - okay. But they didn't have a CAT LNO for this --

25 **Witness** They did not.



1           **HSGAC Minority**   -- for this one, but they had the  
2 counter sniper --

3           **Witness**           The counter sniper advance.

4           **HSGAC Minority**   Okay. And so, President -- or former  
5 President Trump had a rally on July 9th in Doral, and it  
6 was outdoor. So, just trying to pinpoint that timeline.  
7 Did he have -- he did not have Secret Service counter  
8 sniper support at the July 9th rally in Doral. Is that  
9 correct?

10          **Witness**           That that would be correct.

11          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay. And is that just because of --  
12 because it sounds like SOD was aware of it in July 5th.  
13 So, is that just a resource issue, or? I'm trying to  
14 understand kind of why July 13th was the first event where  
15 he received counter sniper support.

16          **Witness**           Yeah. The Butler rally was a larger  
17 rally. And based on the information, we made that decision  
18 you know, obviously during that snapshot in time, based on  
19 other competing trips. And I don't have personal knowledge  
20 of where every single counter sniper was and what was not  
21 available. But that could have played into that decision.

22          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay. If we could go ahead, I'm going  
23 to introduce Exhibit 1, which you already have a copy of  
24 that. This is an unclassified Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  
25 of Staff instruction related to sharing of information. I

1 don't know if I have another copy here. Didn't you have  
2 one? They'll get another copy. Have you seen this before?  
3 Are you aware of this document?

4 [Exhibit No. 1 was  
5 marked for identification.]

6 **Witness** I haven't seen this particular document.

7 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. Well, it relates to -- or it's  
8 actually titled, "Department of Defense Information Sharing  
9 with the U.S. Secret Service Concerning Protection of The  
10 President of The United States and Other Officials."

11 So, I was going to use this since it's unclassified to  
12 kind of talk about information intelligence meetings that  
13 are had and information that's shared. Again, if we get  
14 close to anything that you can't talk about, let me know.  
15 But I think, you know, there is a lot in here that is  
16 unclassified. So, here, under the purpose, in this  
17 document, says, "To identify responsibilities for reporting  
18 all data and information to the Secret Service concerning  
19 immediate, and present danger, or past --"

20 **Witness** Sorry, I apologize. What page? Just so  
21 we --

22 **HSGAC Minority** The first page, I'm on the first page  
23 under, "Purpose."

24 **Witness** Thank you.

25 **HSGAC Minority** Yeah. Immediate and present danger,

1 past incidents bearing on the personal security of anyone  
2 under Secret Service protection." So, I guess, you know,  
3 from this document, it appears that DOD shares intelligence  
4 with the Secret Service related to protectees. Is that  
5 correct?

6 **Witness** Well, and the Secret Service, the  
7 assistant director for the Strategic Intelligence and  
8 Information Directorate, he's our Chief Intelligence  
9 Officer. He is the recipient of all **LES**  
10 Ultimately, he and his staff are the recipient of these  
11 **LES** to a certain degree, vets the number of **LES**  
12 because if we didn't have those services, I would basically  
13 be -- he's on the **LES**, just **LES** all day  
14 and not able to do anything else.

15 So, essentially, that director, that's their function.  
16 They're responsible for providing intelligence to, you  
17 know, Secret Service, writ large, and bring us in to what  
18 information is relevant that we need to be briefed on.

19 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And so, they receive  
20 intelligence, at least from DOD based on this. What other  
21 agencies relay information to Secret Service regarding  
22 protectees?

23 **Witness** Well, we're a consumer of -- we're not a  
24 member of the intelligence community. We're a consumer of  
25 intelligence information. So, there are numerous agencies.

1 I can't speak specifically to the intelligence that we've  
2 seen recently. You know, that would be a question better  
3 answered by the assistant director for SII.

4 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. Does FBI relay intelligence to  
5 the Secret Service?

6 **Witness** Yes. We have partnerships with the FBI,  
7 yes.

8 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And so that information comes in  
9 to the Secret Service through the Strategic Intelligence  
10 Office, and then they pass on that information to you and  
11 your role. Is that correct?

12 **Witness** Yes, ma'am.

13 **HSGAC Minority** Yeah. And why is that? What is the  
14 purpose of passing that information to you?

15 **Witness** That information is not just passed to me,  
16 but it's passed to me, members of my staff, certain members  
17 on the Donald Trump detail are facilitated that  
18 information. And obviously, they're provided that  
19 information for situational awareness in regards to  
20 anything that could be of concern or relate to our  
21 protectee.

22 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And when you say members of your  
23 staff, I mean, I just -- and again, I'm not going to ask  
24 you -- I don't know how widely is this information  
25 disseminated? Is it a couple people, or is it, you know,

1 tens, hundreds? You have a lot of people that are part of  
2 your staff. So, can you just give me a general, you know,  
3 sense of how widely disseminated within your staff, that  
4 kind of information would be?

5 **Witness** Well, it's based on the nature and the  
6 context of the information. And the AD of SII and his  
7 staff determines the people that will be provided, reads to  
8 the information. Sometimes the information is limited to a  
9 **LES**. They're the custodians of that  
10 intelligence and manage that aspect of it. And then, when  
11 I say my staff, deputies, deputy assistant directors  
12 typically would receive some of those reads in regards to  
13 that information. You know, for referring to Donald Trump  
14 detail, the special agent in charge, and I believe his  
15 deputy special agent in charge would receive similar  
16 briefings.

17 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And so, would the Donald Trump  
18 detail always be read into any intelligence that is related  
19 to him as a protectee that the Secret Service receives? Or  
20 are there -- could there be situations where they are not  
21 read in because of compartments or anything else?

22 **Witness** To my knowledge, the briefings that  
23 typically we were receiving, they were receiving is my  
24 understanding. And to get direct confirmation of that  
25 fact, you would need to ask the proper director.

1           **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  And then is the director -- does  
2   the director receive these briefings as well?

3           **Witness**           She receives those briefings in a separate  
4   form from me.  I think it's -- but to my knowledge, yes,  
5   she would receive those briefings.

6           **HSGAC Minority**   To your knowledge, did she receive those  
7   briefings about the Donald Trump detail?

8           **Witness**           I can't specifically say what briefings  
9   she received and didn't because I don't -- I did not do  
10   intelligence briefings contemporaneously in the room with  
11   her.  It typically would be if we got a briefing, we would  
12   go up with myself and another DAD.

13          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  And what about the deputy  
14   director?

15          **Witness**           Yeah.  I would presume he should be  
16   getting those briefings as well.

17          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  So, in the, I guess, weeks  
18   leading up to July 13th, do you recall how many briefings  
19   you received related to the protectee?

20          **Witness**           I don't recall specifically.  I did  
21   receive some briefings related to the protectee.

22          **HSGAC Minority**   So, more than one?

23          **Witness**           Yes.

24          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  More than 10?

25          **Witness**           No.

1 HSGAC Minority Okay. Can you share who briefed?

2 Witness What's that?

3 HSGAC Minority Can you share who actually briefed you?

4 Witness Typically, when we would get called in for  
5 a briefing, Assistant Director Asst. Dir. Intel and Info would be  
6 present. I don't specifically recall the briefer, her or  
7 himself, but oftentimes he would initiate the fact that  
8 something was required to be briefed.

9 HSGAC Minority And what agency --

10 MR. Witness Counsel I'm sorry, I have to ask. Did you say  
11 what agency?

12 HSGAC Minority Yes.

13 MR. Witness Counsel Do you mean what agency provided the  
14 information that they received or who did the briefing?

15 HSGAC Minority Who did the briefing was my initial  
16 question, but I will probably ask the second question as  
17 well.

18 Witness Yeah. I can't discuss what agency the  
19 information was sourced from.

20 HSGAC Minority And just you can't discuss that because  
21 that is classified. I want to just make sure that I  
22 understand.

23 Witness Right. I think due to the nature of the  
24 information, I'm unable to categorize, you know, the  
25 information in this setting regarding your question.

1           **HSGAC Minority** But again, I just want to clarify  
2 because if it was law-enforcement sensitive, we could --  
3 because we could in this setting. So, is that because it  
4 is classified information, who had that information? The  
5 owner of the information, the fact that it's coming from  
6 them that is classified?

7           **Witness** Yes. Yes, ma'am.

8           **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And then what about the briefings  
9 that you received in the weeks leading up? Can you tell me  
10 what agencies were the ones briefing

11          **Witness** To to answer your question this way, the  
12 information that was being provided to us was being briefed  
13 by our own personnel **LES** that they were  
14 receiving **LES** As far as  
15 the sourcing for that information, that would have to be  
16 identified by the AD of SII. My interest is just in the  
17 information from an operational standpoint, really not  
18 where it's coming from per se. I just want the  
19 information.

20          **HSGAC Minority** Right. Okay. And so, were you briefed  
21 by the FBI, or did you have any conversations by anyone  
22 with the FBI in the weeks leading up to the July 13th  
23 related to the protectee?

24          MR. **Witness Counsel** Can I ask, when you say briefed, do you  
25 mean a formal briefing?



1           **HSGAC Minority** No, or, you know, even a conversation as  
2 well. Either, or?

3           **Witness** No. I did not have any conversations with  
4 the FBI leading up to the visit. And those conversations,  
5 again, would've taken place -- the conduit for those  
6 conversations in our agency would've been the director of  
7 SII.

8           **HSGAC Minority** And do you know if he -- do you have  
9 personal knowledge him having conversations with the FBI in  
10 the weeks leading up?

11          **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge if he did  
12 or not.

13          **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And then in the weeks leading up,  
14 were you read into any compartments to receive information  
15 about the protectee?

16          **Witness** I think in this setting I'm unable to  
17 discuss that.

18          **HSGAC Minority** Okay. You said earlier that you didn't  
19 have any -- in your role, you wouldn't have any  
20 conversations with the Trump campaign officials, but would  
21 you have conversations with the Trump detail?

22          **Witness** The deputy assistant director whose  
23 portfolio the Donald Trump detail falls under, she's in  
24 constant communication with the detail. My communication  
25 with the detail was not as often as hers. Being direct

1 sometimes it would occur organically as far as she was on  
2 the phone with maybe a management representative from the  
3 detail and I would jump in on the conversation. But she  
4 was, I would say, in continuous conversation with that  
5 detail due to the nature of that detail.

6 **HSGAC Minority** And we talked a little bit earlier about  
7 how you, along with certain, I think, assistant directors  
8 made the decision that going forward, counter snipers would  
9 be assigned for the Trump campaign or the detail. And then  
10 contemporaneously, there may have been a request from the  
11 Trump detail for the same assets that you had already  
12 decided you were going to provide going forward. Do you  
13 know if that request came in because they received the same  
14 information that you received prior to making that  
15 determination to provide the counter snipers?

16 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of how  
17 that request was generated from the Donald Trump detail.  
18 That could have been a request that just came from their  
19 operations desk, and they wouldn't have had purview to that  
20 information. So, I don't have personal knowledge.

21 **HSGAC Minority** And do you have knowledge of previous  
22 requests by either the Trump detail or the Trump campaign  
23 for Secret Service counter snipers previously?

24 MR. **Witness Counsel** Can I ask this question? When you say,  
25 "do you have knowledge," do you mean prior to July 13th or

1 subsequent to July 13th?

2 **HSGAC Minority** At any time. I guess previous requests,  
3 not the one that we're talking about for the July 13th  
4 rally or any other requests ever made for Secret Service  
5 counter sniper resources for the protectee.

6 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of them  
7 requesting Secret Service counter sniper support. However,  
8 typically, that asset was met through state and local  
9 resources.

10 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. We talked a little bit about the  
11 preliminary survey and the intelligence section of that  
12 preliminary survey for the Butler event. It stated, "At  
13 this time, no adverse intelligence has been developed  
14 concerning this visit. Any adverse intelligence that may  
15 arise will be passed to all the working supervisors." Is  
16 that accurate, based on your knowledge?

17 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of the  
18 protective intelligence advance that was done. You know,  
19 when a protective intelligence advance is conducted, there  
20 are factors that come into play. **LES**

21 **LES** Are there **LES** that  
22 are some examples that could be applicable? I don't have  
23 personal knowledge during that protective intelligence  
24 advance if those facts revealed themselves.

25 **HSGAC Minority** So, I guess, when we're talking about

1 intelligence, I mean, we've been talking about intelligence  
2 and threat information. Is that not what -- so what is the  
3 protective intelligence privy to, or are they supposed to  
4 be looking at all threats? Are they supposed to only be  
5 looking at local threats? I guess, can you clarify a  
6 little bit?

7 **Witness** Well, what I can speak to is when the  
8 protective intelligence advance was conducted, I don't have  
9 personal knowledge of what they were able to determine and  
10 not determine. I don't have any personal knowledge of any  
11 specific adverse intelligence related to the Butler visit.

12 **HSGAC Minority** And the protectee?

13 MR. **Witness Counsel** Do you mean, is he aware of specific  
14 adverse intelligence related to the protectee?

15 **HSGAC Minority** Mm-hmm.

16 **Witness** And can you ask your question again?

17 **HSGAC Minority** So, you said that you weren't aware of  
18 any intelligence related to the Butler event. Were you  
19 aware of intelligence related to the protectee, adverse  
20 intelligence?

21 **Witness** Well, I think we would start to enter the  
22 classified realm. So, I can't discuss that in this  
23 setting. I'll make note, any intelligence picture is not a  
24 binary descriptor of what to do next in the intelligence  
25 arena. So, which is why I tried to lash back to it was

1 never flagged for my personal attention, nor did anybody  
2 from the director of SII flag for my attention or my  
3 staff's attention that there was specific adverse  
4 intelligence to the Butler visit that we should be  
5 concerned about.

6 **HSGAC Minority** And so, when the protective intelligence  
7 advance is conducted and they're making their assessment,  
8 are they only looking at adverse intelligence, or they only  
9 supposed to consider adverse intelligence related to the  
10 event, or are they also supposed to be including in their  
11 assessment adverse intelligence related to the protectee?

12 **Witness** Well, the protective intelligence advance  
13 is something that is going to be conducted in coordination  
14 with and in collaboration with the Director of Strategic  
15 Intelligence Information. I think that would be a question  
16 that would be best answered by that directorate.

17 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And is it that directorate that  
18 would determine whether or not any adverse intelligence is  
19 passed on to the working supervisors of the event, or the  
20 field office where the event or the protectee is going to  
21 be?

22 **Witness** Essentially, to answer your question, they  
23 would have to make that determination because we are not  
24 owners of the intelligence. We are consumers of the  
25 intelligence. And the ability for the distro of that

1 intelligence is a decision that is going to take place  
2 between the AD of SII and whoever he's interfacing with.  
3 That's not a decision that I make.

4 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. I think I'm done.

5 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. This is **HSGAC Minority** with  
6 Senator Paul's office. First of all, thank you for your 27  
7 years of service. I can understand why you would want to  
8 go home. And it's good to talk to somebody that  
9 understands leadership supervision. You've done this at a  
10 high level. I think that you've learned that leadership is  
11 difficult, but it's a voluntary position.

12 **Witness** Yes, sir.

13 **HSGAC Minority** You chose to be in that position, and  
14 that's commendable. Obviously, and listening to your  
15 testimony, you've had a lot of experience in a lot of  
16 different things, and I think that's great for us today  
17 because, finally, maybe somebody's going to tell us who was  
18 responsible for some specific failures. Because part of  
19 your job as a leader, I would believe, and your oversight,  
20 is understanding who's responsible for what.

21 Well, what we've heard, a lot of testimony, is a lot  
22 of people didn't understand clearly their roles, their  
23 responsibilities, which in turn inhibits accountability.  
24 So, maybe you can help us out today. I hope so. You said  
25 earlier that in your position, you have to rely on a lot of

1 people doing their job well. And let's just specifically  
2 talk about a protective mission because you had a lot to  
3 do. Well, let's think of July 13th, 2024.

4 So, I'm going to ask you some very specific questions  
5 that probably should get a very specific answer. Who  
6 within the United States Secret Service is responsible for  
7 the compromise of the AGR roof by Thomas Crooks? And I'm  
8 going to give you a few to think about. Was it the site  
9 agent, the lead agent, the ASAIC, the SAIC, or the counter  
10 sniper lead? Who is responsible?

11 And you know the answer, because you've done it. You  
12 know, who's responsible to ensure that these  
13 vulnerabilities are not exploited? That, as you said,  
14 they're properly mitigated. So, it's a pretty  
15 straightforward question. Who do you think should be  
16 responsible for this failure?

17 **Witness** Well, sir, I understand your frustration.  
18 Obviously, I am upset about this. And this is why we're  
19 doing a comprehensive mission assurance investigation to  
20 get the answers to those questions. And when we get the  
21 answers to those questions based on that comprehensive  
22 investigation, those people that are at fault need to be  
23 held accountable, and disciplined, or whatever the results  
24 of those facts are in regards to the advance and the issues  
25 that took place that caused this tragedy, they need to be

1 held responsible based on that information.

2 **HSGAC Minority** Based on your experience as a  
3 supervisor, field supervisor, if you were the field  
4 supervisor in Pittsburgh, who was responsible for that?

5 **Witness** Well, again, in regards to what has  
6 occurred here, I think those facts need to be evaluated  
7 properly in their aggregate and totality. And when they  
8 are revealed, I hope we will have those answers, and we'll  
9 be able to make those assessments. You know,  
10 unfortunately, I don't have the ability to do the  
11 investigation that comes under the Office of Inspections.  
12 And I know they are diligently working to get us those  
13 answers.

14 **HSGAC Minority** Well, I'll scratch question number two  
15 and three, because I think the answers are going to be the  
16 same.

17 **MR. Witness Counsel** Can I ask one question?

18 **HSGAC Minority** Yes, sir.

19 **MR. Witness Counsel** When you said, "in your experience," do  
20 you mean or perhaps **Witness** can talk about in his  
21 experience, who would typically be responsible for what  
22 you've described things like CS or walkthroughs. Is that  
23 part of what your question is, or are you only --

24 **HSGAC Minority** Yeah, I can restate it. Generally, not  
25 specifically to the Butler rally. But if you were



1 assigning people to be a lead advance, site advance,  
2 counter sniper lead, generally, who would be responsible to  
3 make sure a line-of-sight issues are mitigated?

4 **Witness** Well, there's a combination of factors  
5 that come into developing a security plan. The lead  
6 advance and field office management and/or proxy ultimately  
7 are responsible for the design of the security plan and  
8 leveraging those resources and assets during the advance  
9 process. Defining roles and responsibilities. And the  
10 same principles should apply, protective methodologies,  
11 should apply to every visit.

12 We have three rings of protection of 360 coverage of  
13 enter. It's mostly Secret Service middle, Secret Service  
14 and police in our outer perimeter, starts to become more of  
15 our external partners. However, you do not outsource the  
16 mission, for lack of better words. And that responsibility  
17 falls ultimately on the Secret Service's shoulder to ensure  
18 that proper coordination.

19 **HSGAC Minority** I appreciate that answer. Because I  
20 think that you're leading into exactly what our conclusions  
21 are going to be, too. I want to pass something around and  
22 introduce this as an exhibit. If we can pass it, if  
23 anybody can give that to you. But when you get this just  
24 turn to page 2 for me on the bottom.

25 **MR. Witness Counsel** Sorry, can I just ask? Should we return

1 the Exhibit 1?

2 **HSGAC Minority** Yes.

3 MR. **Witness Counsel** Okay. And then do we do we keep this at  
4 -- or are we identifying this as Exhibit 2?

5 **HSGAC Minority** Exhibit 2, yes. Thank you. And for  
6 ease of identification, I highlighted and put a little  
7 sticker by it too, because it makes me --

8 [Exhibit No. 2 was  
9 marked for identification.]

10 MR. **Witness Counsel** Can we just have --

11 **HSGAC Minority** Absolutely.

12 MR. **Witness Counsel** -- one more? Thank you.

13 **HSGAC Minority** So, in reference to that one specific  
14 section, meticulous advanced work, and threat assessments  
15 to identify potential risks to protectees." Knowing what  
16 you know, and I know you've reviewed some of the documents  
17 that took place in July 13th, 2024, would you consider that  
18 meticulous advance work, in general?

19 **Witness** We, as an agency, rely on our -- the  
20 advance piece of our protective methodologies. That's why  
21 some security services, you'll see a lot of the physical  
22 staffing around the protectee. Because typically, their  
23 advance work is not as comprehensive. That is not  
24 something that you typically see with the Secret Service  
25 because our protective methodologies are based on

1 mitigating risk through that advance process. So, the  
2 advance process, to your point, is key to the success of a  
3 safe visit.

4 **HSGAC Minority** So, would your answer state that that  
5 was not meticulously done this day because it was an  
6 obvious failure and probably multiple failures?

7 **Witness** I am not conducting the investigation, so  
8 I don't have all the facts. But clearly, I don't have  
9 personal knowledge of what the gaps were, but there were  
10 some gaps during the advance process in regards to this  
11 failure.

12 **HSGAC Minority** A couple more questions. I think they  
13 had some questions they want to follow-up with because you  
14 -- and I'm glad you mentioned line of sight mitigation  
15 because that's obviously a major failure here. And I think  
16 when you look through your policies and procedures, it's  
17 very clear who's responsible for that. Hence forth, the  
18 name counter sniper. Their mission is to seek, and  
19 understand, and point out areas where a sniper that they  
20 would be countering would be able to exploit. Am I  
21 correct?

22 **Witness** Yes. Their job is to provide long-range  
23 threat detection and overwatch.

24 **HSGAC Minority** And at the end of the day, we had  
25 someone exploit the AGR. The only known human that

1 exploited the roof of the AGR building before 1811 hours  
2 was Thomas Crooks. Am I correct?

3 **Witness** Yes, sir. That's correct.

4 **HSGAC Minority** So, we would assume that that counter  
5 sniper element failed and their ability to mitigate that  
6 line of sight, and/or positioning of a sniper on the AGR  
7 roof?

8 **Witness** Well, sir, I don't want to give you a  
9 layered answer because I know that's what you don't want to  
10 hear. But the advanced team, and I'll use that word team,  
11 each has a role in contributing to each member's success.  
12 I don't have personal knowledge of every aspect of the  
13 advance, and that's being flushed out in the investigation.

14 But could the counter snipers have been set up for  
15 success during the advance process if there was better  
16 coordination on securing access to the roof of the building  
17 that this individual unfortunately was able to gain high  
18 ground on, which should have never occurred? And as a  
19 result, the counter sniper team had to be utilized as a  
20 last resource to mitigate that threat.

21 **HSGAC Minority** Which I'm glad you mentioned it because  
22 it leads right into my next question. The failure that we  
23 have heard of the Secret Service agents on the advance team  
24 of either ignoring or not reviewing the local plans of  
25 operation, that's concerning to local officials because it

1 almost displays a bit of hubris that they did not feel that  
2 their hard work and labor of putting together a plan that  
3 they were going to operate on was not even reviewed by some  
4 of your people doing it in advance. Is that concerning?

5 **Witness** To answer your question, there always  
6 should be that pre-planning and pre-coordination process  
7 with our state and local counterparts that's key to any  
8 successful visit. I don't have personal knowledge if they  
9 did not review these plans, but Secret Service  
10 methodologies require us to partner with state and local  
11 law enforcement, but you have to have that proper pre-  
12 coordination and pre-planning is essential. So, I don't  
13 have personal knowledge if they didn't review those  
14 operational plans. If they didn't, that is concerning.

15 **HSGAC Minority** I have a couple more that I'll ask  
16 later, but thank you very much.

17 **HSGAC Minority** And one quick follow-up before I turn it  
18 over. Regarding that policy that we -- Exhibit 1 that we  
19 had before, does Secret Service have similar information-  
20 sharing agreements with other agencies that you're aware  
21 of?

22 **Witness** Yes. We have established relationships  
23 with other agencies in regards to information-sharing.  
24 Again, that would be better be addressed by the AD of SII.

25 **HSGAC Minority** And to your knowledge, do you know if

1 those are also memorialized in writing similar to the one  
2 that you're looking at in Exhibit 1?

3 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge if they're  
4 memorialized, but I would speculate they're memorialized in  
5 writing.

6 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And this is requiring -- so this  
7 agreement is requiring Secret Service and DOD to share  
8 information about protectees and threats. If you go to --  
9 I think I labeled it protectees. So, under this policy, if  
10 you look at G, "USSS protectees include the following  
11 persons, G, major presidential and vice-presidential  
12 candidates within 120 days of a general, Presidential  
13 election, and the spouses of such candidates."

14 So, if you go back, Election Day is November 5th. So,  
15 119 days would've been July 9th, the same day actually that  
16 counter snipers were assigned. This limitation that DOD is  
17 only required to share information within 120 days of the  
18 election, do you know if that has ever prevented Secret  
19 Service from receiving intelligence or information outside  
20 of that window?

21 **Witness** I have no personal knowledge if that's  
22 been an obstacle receiving information, but if it's a life  
23 safety issue, I would think there would be a duty to warn  
24 or information would be passed.

25 **HSGAC Minority** So, you feel like, you know,

1 notwithstanding whatever's in here and time limits, does  
2 the Secret Service generally receive threat information on  
3 a real time basis in a collaborative way from the agencies  
4 that have the intelligence or the hold the intelligence?

5 MR. **Agency Counsel** May I jump in? I would encourage the  
6 committee to evaluate whether this policy has a typo in it.  
7 It tracks very closely with the language in 3056, which is  
8 the Secret Service's originating statute. And I'm  
9 apologize for speaking off-the-cuff here, but 3056,  
10 subsection A, notes that the Secret Service's responsible  
11 for protecting major presidential and vice-presidential  
12 candidates, and within 120 days of a general election,  
13 their spouses. So, just wanted to clarify that for the  
14 record. Thank you.

15 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, the actual DOD policy has  
16 that typo.

17 MR. **Agency Counsel** I don't want comment or answer for the  
18 witness, but I would just encourage folks to take a look at  
19 that.

20 **HSGAC Minority** Okay.

21 MR. **Witness Counsel** I'll just say --

22 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. No, go ahead.

23 MR. **Witness Counsel** I was just going to ask if there was a  
24 question I didn't know if you were waiting for him to  
25 answer, so that's fine.

1           **PSI Minority**           Assistant Director **Witness** my name is

2 **PSI Minority**           I work for Ranking Member Ron Johnson.

3 Thank you for your time today.

4           Is it important for Secret Service personnel who are  
5 part of the planning for security for an event with a  
6 protectee to know whether or not there is adverse  
7 intelligence or credible intelligence against the protectee  
8 or the visit itself?

9           **Witness**           You know, I think this applies to the  
10 other gentleman's question. Obviously, when we look at  
11 this visit, it's upsetting, and regardless of the  
12 intelligence, there were gaps --

13          **PSI Minority**          Well, sir, I'm asking just generally.  
14 Is it important for the people planning these events to  
15 know if there is adverse intelligence or credible  
16 intelligence related to a protectee or any event,  
17 generally?

18          **Witness**           Well, intelligence informs operations. It  
19 doesn't dictate operations. And we have a directorate that  
20 is there to evaluate and disseminate intelligence they deem  
21 appropriate to inform protective operations. Yes.

22          **PSI Minority**          So, it is important for those planning  
23 to know intelligence, whether it's incredible intelligence  
24 or adverse intelligence, because it informs their planning  
25 procedures, correct?



1       **Witness**        Intelligence does inform operations, but  
2 it shouldn't dictate basic principles in the planning  
3 process.

4       **PSI Minority**     And in what way does it inform  
5 operations?

6       **Witness**        If there is actionable intelligence or  
7 specific intelligence towards a specific event, that might  
8 be an opportunity to even have a conversation with the  
9 staff to modify an itinerary or a venue. It may also offer  
10 the opportunity to leverage different resources if  
11 required. Things of that nature.

12       **PSI Minority**     Would one of those resources  
13 potentially be the use of counter snipers?

14       **Witness**        It could be a variety of resources one of  
15 which could be counter sniper.

16       **PSI Minority**     Regarding the conversation that you  
17 mentioned before, that we've previously talked about, where  
18 you had the conversation about the application of the  
19 counter sniper asset. Could you please just tell us again  
20 who was part of that conversation with you?

21       **Witness**        Sure. Deputy Assistant Director -- do you  
22 want names?

23       **PSI Minority**     Yes, please, sir.

24       **Witness**        Deputy Assistant Director **Dept. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** ,  
25 and **Dept. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division**

1           **PSI Minority**           And the date of that conversation?

2           **Witness**           Again, from the best that I can recall,  
3 the conversation was in the first week of July. And I  
4 believe it was in the first week of July, certainly prior  
5 to the event.

6           **PSI Minority**           And the decision reached with that  
7 conversation was that counter snipers should be made  
8 available to former President Trump's events. Is that  
9 correct?

10          **Witness**           Yes, sir.

11          **PSI Minority**           Following that conversation did you  
12 have any other conversations with those individuals about  
13 counter snipers being included as part of former President  
14 Trump's events?

15          **Witness**           Did I have any follow-on conversations?

16          **PSI Minority**           Yes, sir. Regarding that specific  
17 topic with those individuals?

18          MR. **Witness Counsel**    Can I just ask, sorry, for the  
19 timeframe, because he's obviously had discussions after  
20 July 13th about counter sniper. But do you mean from  
21 whenever the conversation was up until July 13th?

22          **PSI Minority**           I appreciate the clarification. Yes,  
23 sir.

24          **Witness**           At that point we had the conversation.  
25 There was consensus it was going to be utilized moving

1 forward. So, I'm not sure what having additional dialogue  
2 on the same topic would yield. And, I mean, that  
3 respectfully. I'm not questioning your question. I'm just  
4 saying based on that conversation, we had established we  
5 were going to utilize CS going forward for outdoor events.

6 And then at that point, as I said, I think I was  
7 balancing the competing priorities of being in the middle  
8 of the NATO Summit and then heading out from there,  
9 following out from there and heading out to the RNC.

10 **PSI Minority** So, and just to be clear on the record,  
11 it sounds like, to the best of your recollection, the  
12 answer's no. Is that correct?

13 **Witness** In regards to having additional follow-on  
14 conversations?

15 **PSI Minority** Yes, sir.

16 **Witness** Reauthorizing the authorization of --

17 **PSI Minority** Well, about -- not reauthorizing, but  
18 about the use of counter snipers at campaign events for  
19 former President Trump between the period of when you  
20 initially had the conversation and July 13th.

21 **Witness** I don't recall having a secondary  
22 conversation about the same topic. No. I mean, I think we  
23 tabled that topic and came to consensus on it, and that was  
24 the consensus that we were going to utilize CS.

25 **PSI Minority** Did you have any conversations on this

1 topic with any other individuals besides the ones you  
2 named?

3 **Witness** I don't believe I had that conversation  
4 with anyone else.

5 **PSI Minority** More specifically with Director Cheatle  
6 at the time.

7 **Witness** No. I didn't have a conversation with  
8 Director Cheatle about it.

9 **PSI Minority** And Mr. Rowe?

10 **Witness** I don't know if I -- well, I didn't have a  
11 conversation with him to ask his permission. I'm not sure  
12 if, ultimately, he was informed that this is what we were  
13 going to do. So, I don't have an answer to that question.  
14 I just know I had a conversation with my two DADs, and we  
15 decided this is what we were going to do.

16 **PSI Minority** And once the consensus was reached, who  
17 did you communicate the consensus to?

18 **Witness** Well, **Dept. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** is  
19 the DAD that has the Special Operations Division under his  
20 portfolio. And as I mentioned earlier, he had a  
21 conversation, I believe with, SAIC, Special Agent in  
22 Charge, **ASAIC Special Ops**, who's over with the Special Operations  
23 Division.

24 **PSI Minority** And when were you informed of that?

25 **Witness** Of the actual conversation taking place?

1           **PSI Minority**           Of him communicating the consensus to  
2 those individuals?

3           **Witness**           Well, I think when we had our initial  
4 conversation, he said, okay, I'm going to have a  
5 conversation with **PII** and let him know.

6           **PSI Minority**           Okay. So, you assume that those  
7 conversations occurred?

8           **Witness**           Yes.

9           **PSI Minority**           Okay. One moment, please. Was this  
10 consensus ever -- oh, I'm sorry. Do you need a moment?

11           **MR. Witness Counsel**           Just one moment, if you don't mind.

12           **PSI Minority**           Sure.

13           **MR. Witness Counsel**           So, this is -- I'm just trying to  
14 clarify your question. The timeframe of knowledge about  
15 whether the information was communicated, the witness has  
16 more information that he gleaned or that he's learned after  
17 July 13th. Meaning, he became aware of how that  
18 information may have been passed from the people he spoke  
19 with directly into the office. He acquired that  
20 information after July 13th. Do you want him to talk about  
21 that, or do you only want information acquired before July  
22 13th?

23           **PSI Minority**           Let's stick with before July 13th for  
24 now, sir. And now, in this follow-up, I'll specify. In  
25 the period before July 13th regarding your knowledge of

1 information communicated to other individuals regarding the  
2 use of the counter sniper assets, was any of that  
3 information put in writing?

4 **Witness** Was that information memorialized like in  
5 an email? Not by me. I don't have personal knowledge if  
6 **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** did that in writing, but my understanding was a  
7 conversation was going to take place.

8 **PSI Minority** And once consensus was reached, again  
9 prior to July 13th, are you aware of any communication  
10 about this consensus in writing?

11 **Witness** I have no personal knowledge of it being  
12 in writing in. I assume when it -- well, I don't want to  
13 make a statement that's an assume, but I have no personal  
14 knowledge of it being in writing, to answer your question.

15 **PSI Minority** In your position as the assistant  
16 director, is it your understanding that when the  
17 preliminary survey document that we've discussed earlier,  
18 is it your understanding that when that document is  
19 submitted by the advance team, that the local field office  
20 SAIC will approve that document?

21 **Witness** The local field office management is going  
22 to get that -- will have visibility to that document from  
23 the lead advance agent and it should be reviewed. Again,  
24 it is a document. The approval and oversight of the  
25 security plan should be taking place during the advance,

1 during walkthroughs. A final walkthrough should be  
2 conducted by the field office supervisor in regards to his  
3 or her evaluation of the security plan.

4 **PSI Minority** And your understanding, sir, once the  
5 field office and the advance team submits the documents  
6 like the preliminary survey, what level -- who reviews it  
7 next?

8 **Witness** Typically, someone from the field office  
9 in their operation section will review the survey and  
10 someone in DTD Operations is going to review the survey.

11 **PSI Minority** So, is it your expectation that before  
12 we go to DTD Operations, that everyone in the local field  
13 office has reviewed the document prior to it being  
14 submitted to DTD?

15 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of what  
16 that particular field office did in regards to reviewing  
17 this --

18 **PSI Minority** I'm just asking what your expectation  
19 would be.

20 **Witness** Yes. The expectation would be someone  
21 from supervisory management should be reviewing the  
22 preliminary survey.

23 **PSI Minority** Prior to that document being submitted  
24 to DTD?

25 **Witness** Yes.

1           **PSI Minority**           Okay. Is it your understanding that a  
2 Secret Service counter sniper shot and killed Mr. Crooks?

3           **Witness**           Yes, that's my understanding.

4           **PSI Minority**           How did you come to that understanding

5           **Witness**           That evening, at some point, we were  
6 briefed that it was our counter sniper team that eliminated  
7 the target.

8           **PSI Minority**           Are you aware of any local law  
9 enforcement firing at Mr. Crooks?

10          **Witness**           I'm not aware of local law enforcement  
11 firing at Mr. Crooks.

12          **PSI Minority**           You have not seen any reports on that?

13          **Witness**           I have not seen a report. I'm not privy  
14 to all the details of the investigation. I have not seen a  
15 report.

16          **PSI Minority**           Did you speak to the Secret Service  
17 counter sniper that shot and killed crooks?

18          **Witness**           I briefly spoke to him just to check in  
19 with him and see how he was doing. As a result of my  
20 position, I don't want to have too detail-oriented of a  
21 conversation with the employee, because then I can be  
22 perceived as trying to steer or coerce ultimately whatever  
23 statements he's going to make to our internal investigating  
24 body.

25          **PSI Minority**           And the name of the counter sniper who



1 shot and killed Mr. Crooks?

2 **Witness** **Hercules 1 C/S** **Hercules 1 C/S**.

3 **PSI Minority** And when did you have the conversation  
4 with **Hercules 1 C/S**

5 **Witness** I believe it was possibly the 25th.

6 **PSI Minority** Of July?

7 **Witness** Yes.

8 **PSI Minority** Was it a phone conversation or in  
9 person?

10 **Witness** It was a phone conversation, and I wanted  
11 to wait until I could -- again, the counter sniper unit  
12 falls under the Uniformed Division. I wanted to wait till  
13 his chief was present where I could have that conversation.  
14 After the shooting, **Hercules 1 C/S** **LES**  
15 **LES** and other -- dealing with other challenges. So, I  
16 wanted to have his chief be present where we could do the  
17 call together.

18 **PSI Minority** And who was his chief?

19 **Witness** **Uniformed Div Chief**. He's the chief of the  
20 Uniformed Division. **Uniformed Div Chief**.

21 **PSI Minority** **Uniformed Div Chief** Okay. Thank you. And  
22 when you spoke to **Hercules 1 C/S** did you ask him any information  
23 about what happened, what he experienced?

24 **Witness** No. I wanted it to intentionally be a  
25 brief conversation. I just wanted to say to the effect,

1 you know, you're in our thoughts. That type of sentiment.  
2 And I didn't really get into any kind of fact finding or  
3 type of inquiry. That wasn't the point of the call. It  
4 was more just to let them know we're thinking about him,  
5 and you know, behind him.

6 **PSI Minority** Has anyone from DHS or Secret Service  
7 instructed you not to speak with Congress?

8 **Witness** No.

9 MR. **Witness Counsel** Sorry for the question. Did you say to  
10 not speak with Congress or with **Hercules 1 C/S**

11 **PSI Minority** To Congress, sir?

12 **Witness** No. No one has instructed me not to speak  
13 to Congress.

14 **PSI Minority** Thank you. At this point, I think  
15 we're at the hour mark. So, we'll go ahead and take a  
16 five-minute break if that works for you, sir.

17 **Witness** Thank you.

18 [Recess.]

19 **PSI Minority** I think we'll go back on the record  
20 now. **PSI Minority** again, from Ranking Member Ron  
21 Johnson's office. I just want to pick up on something that  
22 I think one of my colleagues on Ranking Member Paul's staff  
23 asked earlier regarding security failures on July 13th.

24 As you may know, sir, now Acting Director Rowe  
25 testified in front of our committee on July 30th and said

1 that there were gaps in security that he identified and  
2 that protection on that day failed. Those are his words.  
3 Do you believe that there were gaps in security and that  
4 protection failed on July 13th?

5 **Witness** Yes. Obviously, there were gaps. There  
6 was a failure. I'm upset that this is the place we're in.  
7 I think if some basic principles had been adhered to, we  
8 wouldn't be here as the other gentleman stated. And it's  
9 infuriating.

10 **PSI Minority** What were those gaps in security that  
11 you referred to?

12 **Witness** Well, again, I'm not conducting the  
13 investigation, and I don't have personal knowledge of all  
14 aspects of the advance. But clearly, there were  
15 communication gaps that day that led to this failure. And  
16 if those communication gaps had been mitigated, information  
17 could have been passed in a more timely fashion that  
18 would've avoided that failure.

19 **PSI Minority** What specific communication gaps, sir?

20 **MR. Witness Counsel** Sorry, can we have one moment?

21 **PSI Minority** Sure.

22 **MR. Witness Counsel** Just for clarification, what the witness  
23 is inquiring about is, are you asking his opinion, knowing  
24 that as a preparatory part of the question. He's not doing  
25 the investigation. He doesn't have the contents of the

1 investigation. You're asking for his opinion on those  
2 things based on the information he's learned after July  
3 13th. Is that the basis of the question?

4 **PSI Minority** I'm asking for his opinion, or to the  
5 extent that he has specific knowledge.

6 MR. **Witness Counsel** Got it. Okay.

7 **Witness** Well, I did not conduct the advance. I  
8 don't have firsthand knowledge, but based on information  
9 I've learned after the fact and even one could almost  
10 observe from a third-party perspective. The communications  
11 plan was, in my opinion, siloed. We had a security room  
12 with a Secret Service supervisor, a member of the  
13 Pennsylvania State Police, and then approximately 120 yards  
14 to 300 yards away. You had a mobile command post with the  
15 various law enforcement agencies represented.

16 So, I will speak in generalities to answer your  
17 question. In law enforcement, one of the most basic  
18 tenants is one has to be able to communicate. What  
19 frustrates me, and maybe I'm dating myself, but I keep  
20 hearing about technology, and this, and that, and the other  
21 thing, and/or some panacea radio-type system where, again,  
22 if you just had a well-staffed, unified command post with  
23 law enforcement appropriately co-located for command and  
24 control, and the ability to contemporaneously communicate  
25 and pass information, we wouldn't have had -- or I'll say,

1 I don't have all the facts to the investigation, but you  
2 won't have stovepipe communications that can cause failures  
3 that we saw up at Butler as a result of communication being  
4 delayed.

5 **Witness** This individual was walking around for an  
6 hour, but somehow information seemed to be getting stove  
7 piped. Sometimes in law enforcement, there isn't a script  
8 for every play or every scenario you may encounter, but  
9 just by sitting in that unified command post, "Oh, what did  
10 you hear? There's a guy, so and so." And oftentimes  
11 that's how information in reality is going to get passed.

12 Even if you had one radio communication frequency and  
13 everyone could speak on, it would be worthless because  
14 everyone would be stepping on each other. And oftentimes  
15 in exigent situations, you can take their, you can't even  
16 talk on the radio, but it's that lead up prior to something  
17 becoming kinetic, which is essential in that command and  
18 control.

19 So, if the information is correct, which I don't have  
20 firsthand knowledge of, but there was a Secret Service  
21 security room with only a Secret Service supervisor and a  
22 member of the Pennsylvania State Police. Why would you not  
23 embed them in that unified mobile command post to have that  
24 command and control? If there was an incident or something  
25 percolating, establish that jurisdictional deconfliction

1 and address the issue.

2 I mean, if I was to use an analogy; if there's any  
3 football fans, if we have the coach calling in the plays to  
4 the quarterback, and we have the defensive coordinator on  
5 the same radio frequency, it's not going to work. So, I  
6 don't really put much stock in the hole. There's been this  
7 whole notion of radios and radio. You establish a unified  
8 command so people can communicate and collaborate and reach  
9 out to their respective entities.

10 **PSI Minority** Are you aware of what specific  
11 information was available in that security room on July  
12 13th in the minutes leading up to the assassination  
13 attempt?

14 **Witness** Which security room?

15 **PSI Minority** The one with Secret Service.

16 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge of what  
17 information was being passed. After the fact, there was  
18 some communication that was passed to the security room  
19 related to the individual.

20 **PSI Minority** And given what you just said regarding  
21 the difficulties of passing information if between separate  
22 locations, what about within the same location within the  
23 Secret Service security room? What is your understanding  
24 of those communication gaps?

25 **Witness** Within the security room itself? Well, I

1 think you had a lack of representation of the respective  
2 law enforcement agencies in that room. As I mentioned in  
3 my previous dialogue, that would've facilitated a timely  
4 passing of that communication to the affected entities.

5 **PSI Minority** Besides communication gaps as one of  
6 the gaps in security that you mentioned, were there any  
7 other gaps in security?

8 **Witness** Well, if I can speak from a principled  
9 standpoint, one thing you learn at the Academy, one of our  
10 most elementary concerns is obviously line of sight. And  
11 you utilize physical structures. You can utilize physical  
12 structures to mitigate line of sight. You can bring in box  
13 trucks, you can bring in -- and there was some of that that  
14 took place at that site. And those are very basic building  
15 block concepts that we use to take certain things out of  
16 sight to mitigate line of sight. And those principles  
17 should always be applied.

18 **PSI Minority** Anything else?

19 **Witness** The most important part of an advance when  
20 you're working with other agencies, and this is  
21 memorialized in our manual during the advance process, is  
22 there is understanding that your local counterparts may  
23 have, you know, less experience in regards to Secret  
24 Service methodologies.

25 Now, I'm not quoting it verbatim, and I'm

1 paraphrasing, but the point is, during the advance process,  
2 it's your responsibility through meetings, through police  
3 meetings, through walkthroughs, through final walkthroughs,  
4 to ensure that your counterparts understand the security  
5 plan and their role within the security plan.

6 **PSI Minority** So, just so I understand, sir. As far  
7 as you're aware, Secret Service personnel did not come to  
8 that understanding with their local counterparts?

9 **Witness** Again, I don't have personal knowledge of  
10 every aspect of what they did and didn't know. But they  
11 need during the advance week to ensure that their local  
12 counterparts understand their role in that comprehensive  
13 security plan, and do the actions even a third party could  
14 observe on the ground. Clearly, there was some confusion.  
15 So, what was the extent of that pre-coordination and  
16 planning during the advance process? That remains to be  
17 determined.

18 **PSI Minority** I'm going to turn it over to my  
19 colleague, **PSI Minority**

20 **PSI Minority** Hi, Assistant Director **Witness** My name's  
21 **PSI Minority** with Senator Johnson's office. Thank you for  
22 being here. We're going to introduce an exhibit and **PSI Minority**  
23 **PSI Minority**'s passing it around. I think it'll be Exhibit 3.

24 [Exhibit No. 3 was  
25 marked for identification.]



1           **PSI Minority**     This is a Washington Post article from  
2 July 30th, 2024, titled, "Trump Rally Gunman Stopped Firing  
3 After Local Officer Shot at Him."

4           And I would like everyone to turn their attention to  
5 page 3. And I believe each copy I briefly highlighted the  
6 section that I'd like to talk about. That section reads  
7 from the Post, "The local law enforcement official close to  
8 the investigation did not know whether the local officer's  
9 shot hit Crooks. But shortly after that shot, Crooks  
10 altered his positioning, the official said. Crooks stopped  
11 shooting at the rally site and slumped down behind the  
12 crest of the sloped roof where he was perched, the official  
13 said.

14          After the local police officer's shot, there was  
15 definitely some sort of reaction, the official said.  
16 Crooks slumped over, and he didn't fire another round. The  
17 official credited the local officer with interrupting  
18 Crook's attack. Anything that disrupts an active shooter  
19 can keep the situation from situation from being  
20 significantly more catastrophic."

21          Is this news to you, Assistant Director **Witness**

22          MR. **Witness Counsel**     Sorry, do you mean is the article new --  
23 as in he hasn't seen it, or do you mean the content of the  
24 article?

25          **PSI Minority**     The content of what I just read. Is this

1 new to him?

2 **Witness** I don't have knowledge of a local officer  
3 -- of the local officer who shot. There's initial  
4 reporting that local law enforcement may have shot the  
5 individual, but then it was concluded that our CS -- and  
6 this is, you know, as things were just breaking that night.  
7 That's my last recollection of information that could be --  
8 have a similar to this. But my knowledge is our counter  
9 sniper shot the suspect, the individual.

10 **PSI Minority** So, after the assassination attempt took  
11 place, you never received any update or information that a  
12 local officer in Butler may have taken a shot at Crooks on  
13 the AGR building?

14 **Witness** There was initial reporting of that. At  
15 this time, I don't recall receiving updated reporting of  
16 that.

17 **PSI Minority** After the shots rang out at 6:11 in  
18 Butler, could you walk us through the proceeding hours and  
19 who you spoke with? What information was provided or  
20 discussed? Can you walk us through the night of July 13th?  
21 We know you were in Milwaukee at the RNC, but can you talk  
22 to us about who you spoke with; Director Cheatle, Deputy  
23 Director Rowe, and what information was discussed on the  
24 night of the 13th?

25 **Witness** Well, at that point, as I mentioned

1 earlier, we went back -- I went back to the Coordinating  
2 Center along with my **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division**, special agent in charge  
3 of the Dignitary Protective Division, **SAIC Dignitary Division**. At  
4 that point, I also reached out to **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops**. And then  
5 was in the process of reaching out to **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** who had -  
6 - I mean, technically he was starting the next day on the  
7 14th. He's relatively new to OPO. **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** reported to  
8 our Directorate Crisis Center. **Dep. Asst. Dir. Protective Ops** was intending  
9 to head up to **LES**  
10 **LES**.

11 And then on that night, there were a series of calls  
12 with the directorate staff, some of which were located in  
13 Milwaukee, and some of which were still located in  
14 Washington, DC, which I believe the bulk of them were.  
15 Obviously, I was out at the RNC because the NRC was going  
16 on.

17 **PSI Minority** So, the night of July 13th, did you speak  
18 directly with Director Cheatle or Deputy Director Rowe  
19 about the Butler assassination attempt?

20 **Witness** Yes. Myself and **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division** were in another  
21 room. She was in a room across the hall. At that point,  
22 obviously, I was just focused on any follow-ons that could  
23 happen, focused on surging on the White House,  
24 communicating with the other details, **LES**  
25 **LES**, and collaborating with the Uniformed

1 Division. And that's where my focus and **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division** focus  
2 was.

3 **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division** was more or less communicating with the DSAIC  
4 from the Donald Trump detail because, obviously, the SAIC  
5 was at his hands full. So, she more or less leveraged him  
6 to communicate with the detail. And then, where I guess we  
7 would intersect with the director is when the director  
8 crisis calls would take place then we would go in that room  
9 and participate in that collective calling process.

10 **PSI Minority** On the night of July 13th, when you were  
11 on those director crisis calls, is that the first time you  
12 apprised Director Cheadle or Deputy Director Rowe that  
13 counter sniper assets were at Butler and you had approved  
14 them for former President Trump's outdoor rallies?

15 **Witness** I don't know if I brought up that I  
16 approved them. I just brought up the fact that it was our  
17 counter sniper that was the shooter and they were at the  
18 site.

19 **PSI Minority** Right. What I'm trying to figure out is  
20 this; did Director Cheadle and Deputy Director Rowe know  
21 that you had approved counter sniper assets to former  
22 President Trump's outdoor rallies?

23 **Witness** I don't recall if I specifically told them  
24 or not that I had approved it. I just informed them that  
25 it was, in fact, our CS when we were discussing the matter.

1           **PSI Minority**     What was Director Cheattle's or Deputy  
2 Director Rowe's reaction to that?

3           **Witness**        I didn't make an assessment or the  
4 reaction. I mean, it was a frenetic time, you know,  
5 getting multiple calls trying to get ahold of people. I  
6 mean, it was just passing information.

7           **PSI Minority**     So, the night of July 13th, Director  
8 Cheattle, and Deputy Director Rowe, were they aware that  
9 former President Trump's event in Butler had counter sniper  
10 assets?

11          **Witness**        Were they aware?

12          **PSI Minority**     Correct, sir.

13          **Witness**        I don't know if they were aware. I mean -  
14 -

15          **PSI Minority**     Because you didn't tell them about your  
16 signing off on them. Is that correct?

17          **Witness**        I don't want to say I didn't tell them.  
18 Conversely, I wouldn't feel the need to tell them, or not  
19 tell them, or ask their permission to approve counter  
20 sniper.

21          **PSI Minority**     What approval of assets would make you  
22 have to tell your superiors.

23          **Witness**        As far as approving any asset?

24          **PSI Minority**     Yes, sir.

25          MR. **Witness Counsel**    Sorry, can I ask a question? Do you

1 mean what type of asset would rise to the level of asking  
2 for approval from the director and deputy director, or do  
3 you mean how does it work?

4 **PSI Minority** My question is what type of assets are  
5 you required to notify your superiors of if you approve of  
6 them?

7 **Witness** Well, I'll answer the question this way.  
8 I don't know if I'm required, but I know when I approved  
9 counter assault, you know, in April, I informed the deputy  
10 director. You know, I said, "Hey, just so you know, we're  
11 assigning counter assault to the Donald Trump detail." You  
12 know, and I would think the same thing would've occurred  
13 when I signed counter sniper just to pass for information.  
14 And I would suppose if he objected, he would've informed me  
15 of his objection.

16 **PSI Minority** On the night of July 13th, on the  
17 director crisis call, did Director Cheadle and Deputy  
18 Director Rowe know that **Hercules 1 C/S** had shot Crooks, or was this  
19 the first time they had been informed of that?

20 **Witness** I think we were getting updates on those  
21 director crisis calls, or I shouldn't say, I think we were  
22 getting updates on what transpired on the ground on those  
23 director crisis calls. And during one of those calls, at  
24 some point, we were informed that **Hercules 1 C/S** was the shooter.

25 **PSI Minority** Did Director Cheadle or Deputy Director

1 Rowe task you with anything to obtain from Butler, PA on  
2 those calls on July 13th?

3 **Witness** Well, at that point for command and  
4 control of the scene, that will come under the assistant  
5 director of investigations. And at that point, interim  
6 presence is going to be maintained by the local field  
7 office management, and they're going to be the conduit to  
8 be getting information off the ground, working in  
9 conjunction with our protective intelligence folks.

10 **PSI Minority** Is there anything else from that director  
11 crisis call that night of July 13th that the committee  
12 should know about?

13 **Witness** Well, as I said, there were a series of  
14 calls that night, and my interpretation of those calls is  
15 we were trying to get information, and insight, and  
16 understanding, and were getting updates as to what happened  
17 in regards to this incident.

18 **PSI Minority** Did you have anyone from your directorate  
19 on the ground in Butler, PA on July 13th?

20 **Witness** Yes. We had Uniformed Division officers,  
21 obviously, the Donald Trump detail, and one of the side  
22 agents

23 **PSI Minority** Who on the ground in Butler, PA did you  
24 directly communicate with to get information about what had  
25 happened?

1           **Witness**           Who did I communicate directly with on the  
2 ground?

3           **PSI Minority**       Yes, sir.

4           **Witness**           We were communicating, as I mentioned  
5 earlier, with the DSAIC of the Donald Trump detail. And my  
6 **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division**, we were basically sitting in a room in the  
7 coordination center. She was sitting at a desk next to  
8 mine, and essentially, she was communicating with the  
9 DSAIC. And I was sitting there listening to the  
10 conversations.

11          **PSI Minority**       Who's the name of the DSAIC down in  
12 Butler?

13          **Witness**           **Dep Asst Agent in Charge**

14          **PSI Minority**       **Dep Asst Agent in Charge**

15          **Witness**           **Dep Asst Agent in Charge**

16          **PSI Minority**       Could you spell that?

17          **Witness**           It's **Dep Asst Agent in Charge**.

18          **PSI Minority**       Thank you.

19          **Witness**           That's who **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dignitary Division** was basically  
20 communicating with that night. That's when, I believe, the  
21 first call that came in came to **Dep. Asst. Dir. Dig** to him.

22          **PSI Minority**       When you were working the RNC up in  
23 Milwaukee, is it standard procedure for Secret Service to  
24 contact and reach out to local businesses around the venue  
25 that the RNC was occurring at?



1           **Witness**       Yes. We establish -- we typically have --  
2   it's like an outreach subcommittee that will interface with  
3   members of the local, public, and local businesses.  
4   Because obviously, the anti-scale fencing perimeter that we  
5   drop can be a disruptive force throughout any city, and we  
6   want to be able to facilitate not disrupting their  
7   businesses.

8           **PSI Minority**   And I recognize that the NRC is different  
9   from what the rally was at Butler, but once again, would it  
10  be standard procedure for the rally in Butler for Secret  
11  Service agents to interact with local businesses around the  
12  site?

13          **Witness**       Well, speaking generalities, any site that  
14  you have is typically going to impact neighboring  
15  businesses, possibly residences. And during your advance,  
16  part of your normal course of business is to interact with,  
17  you know, the owners of those businesses or those  
18  residences. If you're going to say shut down someone's  
19  access to their private residence as part of your security  
20  planning, you'll have to come up with some way to  
21  facilitate, obviously, the entry to their home if it's  
22  bordering on your perimeter, so to speak. So, those type  
23  of interactions are common.

24          **PSI Minority**   Did Secret Service agents interact with  
25  anyone who worked the AGR building before July 13th?

1           **Witness**            I don't have personal knowledge of their  
2 interaction. You know, subsequent to the 13th, you know, I  
3 was informed the AGR building, the AGR cluster of buildings  
4 was closed for the day. So, if I had to make an  
5 assumption, I assume someone from the advance team must  
6 have had some kind of interaction with the owner.

7           **PSI Minority**        Do you know that to have happened, or  
8 you're just assuming that happened?

9           **Witness**            I don't have personal knowledge if that  
10 happened.

11          **PSI Minority**        A couple more questions, then I'll turn  
12 it over to my colleagues. Did Crooks act alone?

13          **Witness**            Did Crooks act alone on that day? Did to,  
14 to my knowledge it was one shooter and he acted alone.

15          **PSI Minority**        Was Crooks on any local, state, or  
16 federal radar before July 13th?

17          **Witness**            I think that would be a question better  
18 directed to the FBI. I don't have knowledge if he was.

19          **PSI Minority**        Did you interact with the ATF on the  
20 night of July 13th or any point after July 13th?

21          **Witness**            I did not interact with the ATF. That  
22 would be the office of Investigations.

23          **PSI Minority**        Okay. Thank you. I'll turn it over to  
24 my colleagues.

25          **HSGAC Majority**      Thank you. Assistant Director **Witness** a

1 couple of follow-up questions on something you were just  
2 discussing with my colleagues. You spoke about  
3 communication gaps as one of, in your opinion, the failures  
4 on July 13th. And you talked a little bit about delays in  
5 information getting to the Secret Service. But I wanted to  
6 follow-up on what is supposed to happen once information  
7 does reach the Secret Service? And in your experience, you  
8 know, you could speak in generalities, not necessarily with  
9 respect to the event on the 13th, but when information  
10 reaches the Secret Service, who is responsible for ensuring  
11 that relevant information gets to others in the Secret  
12 Service, who should have that information?

13 **Witness** Well, at any site, the security room is  
14 supposed to serve as a hub of communications, so to speak.  
15 In generalities, if you received information of an  
16 individual, you would put that over the radio via the  
17 security room. You have the ability to dispatch a -- you  
18 would have a **LES**,  
19 that could go and investigate and talk to the individual,  
20 establish a consensual conversation, and see where that  
21 leads.

22 **HSGAC Majority** And within the security room, is it the  
23 Security Room agent who's responsible for ensuring that  
24 information gets out, or is it a shared responsibility  
25 amongst others

1           **Witness**           For Secret Service personnel, that  
2 information would be passed by the Secret Service  
3 representative in the security room. I would typically --  
4 contemporaneously if there's local law enforcement  
5 representation in the security room, I would think that  
6 information would be passed as well because, obviously,  
7 it's a collaborative effort.

8           **HSGAC Majority**   And would it be, you know, if  
9 information reaches you said that the Secret Service  
10 representative -- and our understanding is that there was  
11 more than one Secret Service official in the Secret Service  
12 security room on the day of the 13th, but that one of those  
13 people was designated as a security room agent. Is that  
14 who you're referring to as the representative, or?

15          **Witness**           Yeah. The supervisor in the security room  
16 should be the individual that's passing the information.

17          **HSGAC Majority**   Okay. And, you know, just speaking from  
18 your background and your general, you know, all of your  
19 experience in law enforcement and the Secret Service, the  
20 fact of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder being  
21 identified at a rally, an outdoor event, were that  
22 information to reach the security room, is that something  
23 that, in your opinion, should be radioed-out widely to the  
24 Secret Service

25          **Witness**           Based on just the fact of the range

1 finder, or based on other additional factors, just so I  
2 understand your question?

3 **HSGAC Majority** It's the fact that local law enforcement  
4 has spotted a suspicious individual with the range finder.  
5 And without any further information, would that be  
6 something in itself that is worthy of passing onto a wider  
7 audience over the radio?

8 **Witness** If information was passed to me that there  
9 was an individual around one of our sites with a range  
10 finder, I would want to have a follow-up conversation with  
11 that individual. Now, have there been other sites where  
12 hobbyists have had range finders? Yes. But it's also  
13 based on a totality circumstances, and each situation is  
14 going to be evaluated based on those particular sets of  
15 facts. But based on from what I've been told, it seems  
16 like there was additional information that would've  
17 warranted a conversation possibly.

18 **HSGAC Majority** And from your view, you know, if local  
19 law enforcement or whichever entities are attempting to  
20 locate and have that conversation with the individual, if  
21 they're unable to locate them, and it's communicated to you  
22 that, you know, we've been trying to track the individual  
23 with the range finder, we haven't been able to find him and  
24 interview him, is that information that you believe should  
25 be shared widely in the Secret Service before the protectee

1 is allowed to take the stage?

2 **Witness** Well, I believe more information is  
3 better, and before one is going to go to from a steady  
4 state of operations and into crisis management, it is going  
5 to be a basis of information that informs that decision-  
6 making. So, timely passing of information is always key.  
7 So, to answer your question, in general, real-time updates  
8 help inform your situational awareness of what's going on  
9 at any site.

10 **HSGAC Majority** And in terms of, you know -- I mean,  
11 obviously we know that the protectee was -- that no changes  
12 were made to his movements in advance of the shooting.  
13 What is your understanding of who would've been in a  
14 position to make a decision on whether to either prevent  
15 the former President from taking the stage or to pull him  
16 off the stage after he had already started? I guess what  
17 I'm trying to ask is who would've been in a position to  
18 evaluate information and make a decision on whether it  
19 warranted a change in the protectees planned movements?

20 **Witness** Well, again, I'll answer the question this  
21 way. I don't have personal knowledge of what -- to answer  
22 your question, the person that would take the protectee off  
23 the stage could be a member of the working shift, would  
24 typically be the working supervisor or the second  
25 supervisor to make that kind of decision. But I'm not

1 aware of what information they had at that time that would  
2 inform that decision-making. Obviously, taking a protectee  
3 off the stage is a significant thing. So, I would  
4 speculate they would want to ensure they had the correct  
5 information before they did such a thing.

6 **HSGAC Majority** Yeah. Understood. And just one more  
7 question on along these lines. Understanding that it's the  
8 shift or the shift in detail, or that the detail agents who  
9 are close to the protectee, in your view, you know, any  
10 Secret Service agent working an event is aware of the fact  
11 that it's the shift that is close to the protectee and  
12 needs to have relevant information that may be taken into  
13 consideration if a change of the movements is needed. Is  
14 that's an understanding of everyone in the Secret Service  
15 at an event would have maybe -- let me say that again.

16 Is it fair to say that any Secret Service agent  
17 working an event with a protectee would share the  
18 understanding that information that may warrant  
19 reevaluating the protectee's movements, that information  
20 should be passed to members of the shift or the protectee's  
21 detail?

22 **Witness** Yes. Timely passing of information is  
23 key.

24 **HSGAC Majority** And specifically, to members of the  
25 detail?

1           **Witness**           Of the working shift, yes.

2           **HSGAC Majority**   Okay. And in your experience  
3 holistically, you know, again, obviously understanding  
4 circumstances are -- you know, individual circumstances  
5 need to be taken into account, but if you receive  
6 information that you think, you know, I'm not sure if this  
7 is serious enough, you know, this is something that those  
8 around the protectee should be aware of. Your  
9 understanding is the expectation is you would radio that to  
10 the shift?

11          **Witness**           Yes. Well, if there's information that  
12 would be relevant to the shift in regards to a protectee's  
13 movement, obviously related to the protectee's safety,  
14 potential safety, that should be immediately passed.

15          **HSGAC Majority**   And would an individual on a rooftop be  
16 that sort of information that should be passed?

17          **Witness**           If you had an unauthorized individual on a  
18 rooftop that had line of sight at any site, that would give  
19 me concern to pause before exposing the protectee to that  
20 line of sight. Yes.

21          **HSGAC Majority**   And if you came across that information,  
22 is that something you would immediately radio to the shift?

23          **Witness**           If there was an unauthorized individual on  
24 the roof?

25          **HSGAC Majority**   Yeah.



1           **Witness**            Yes.  If there was an unauthorized  
2 individual on a roof that had line of sight to a protectee,  
3 that should be immediately passed.

4           **HSGAC Majority**    Okay.  Thank you.  That's all I have.

5           **PSI Majority**            I have just a few questions.  Thanks,  
6 again.  There are certain members of a protective event of  
7 a site that have technical training.  In particular, I'm  
8 thinking of the CUAS operators.  Are there certifications  
9 for operating CUAS equipment?

10          **Witness**            That doesn't fall under my purview, but  
11 people in the Secret Service that operate Counter UAS  
12 receive training from our director of training.

13          **PSI Majority**            And is that required?

14          **Witness**            It's training that's required.  Yes.

15          **PSI Majority**            It's mandatory to receive that  
16 training, that to require certification before you operate  
17 that equipment?

18          **Witness**            To my knowledge, yes.  But that's  
19 administered or managed by the director of training.

20          **PSI Majority**            And is that underneath your office?

21          **Witness**            No.

22          **PSI Majority**            No?  Okay.

23          **Witness**            No.

24          **PSI Majority**            So, do you have any oversight over  
25 CUAS capabilities?

1           **Witness**           No. The Counter UAS assets fall under the  
2 director of technology and development. We've changed the  
3 name a couple times, but technology and development.

4           **PSI Majority**       Okay. So, there's no overlap for  
5 events or making sure events are either resources, or  
6 assets, or qualified professionals?

7           **Witness**           To my understanding is to operate Counter  
8 UAS, you receive training from the director of training and  
9 they administer that.

10          **PSI Majority**       And if you received somebody to  
11 operate a piece of equipment that was not qualified, would  
12 that fall within your purview?

13          **Witness**           If they -- can you ask the question again?

14          MR. **Witness Counsel**   Sorry, can I just clarify? Do you mean  
15 a Counter UAS asset?

16          **PSI Majority**       A Counter UAS. That you had equipment  
17 at the site and the person who showed up was unqualified to  
18 operate the equipment?

19          MR. **Witness Counsel**   Is that under, you're asking if it's  
20 under his supervision?

21          **PSI Majority**       Yes. Or not you directly, but  
22 somebody in your unit of management?

23          **Witness**           Well, the Donald Trump detail had people  
24 that were trained to go out and do Counter UAS and the  
25 special agent in charge of that detail before they had them

1 take on that assignment or tasking should have sent them to  
2 the director of training's course on Counter UAS.

3 **PSI Majority** It was our understanding that the only  
4 person on site that day to operate Counter UAS equipment  
5 had less than an hour of training to operate that  
6 equipment. Does that surprise you?

7 MR. **Witness Counsel** Is the question, did he have an  
8 understanding of that, or that --

9 **PSI Majority** Well, I guess two parts. Did you have  
10 an understanding of that? Was that your understanding, and  
11 if not, does it surprise you?

12 **Witness** I did not have an understanding of that,  
13 and my understanding was the Counter UAS training was a  
14 course that they take under our director of training at our  
15 training center.

16 **PSI Majority** So, it does surprise you?

17 **Witness** It surprises me in what context?

18 **PSI Majority** That he received less than an hour of  
19 training before that day?

20 **Witness** I don't know the exact length of the  
21 training course that the director of training provides, but  
22 -- I don't have understanding of the syllabus or the  
23 agenda, but --

24 **PSI Majority** He never attended a formal course. It  
25 was field training and it was less than an hour.

1           **Witness**           Okay.

2           **PSI Majority**       Does that surprise you?

3           **Witness**           That surprises me.

4           **PSI Majority**       And I know we're running short on  
5 time. I'll try to move a little bit faster. You had  
6 mentioned that one of the failures was line of sight, and  
7 you mentioned a hardware that could be used to mitigate  
8 line of sight. And our understanding in talking to various  
9 agents was that there were trucks, farm equipment,  
10 bleachers, or various measures that were considered to  
11 mitigate line of sight? Is that your understanding as  
12 well?

13          **Witness**           Yes.

14          **PSI Majority**       And do you know why those were not  
15 implemented?

16          **Witness**           Just so I understand your question. I  
17 thought you said that they used various pieces of farm  
18 equipment?

19          **PSI Majority**       That they had considered using it, but  
20 that they didn't wind up using it to mitigate the AGR  
21 complex of buildings.

22          **Witness**           They did use some of the farm equipment to  
23 mitigate line of sight. I think there was, based on what  
24 I've received secondhand, some back and forth in regards to  
25 the placement of the farm, combine equipment.

1           **PSI Majority**           And back and forth with whom?

2           **Witness**           The staff.

3           **PSI Majority**           Secret service staff?

4           **Witness**           No, I think the campaign staff.

5           **PSI Majority**           The campaign staff. And in a back and  
6 forth like that, who's -- and I think this gets back to a  
7 question I was asking before of who, you know, where the  
8 buck stops here, right? Like, who's the person who says,  
9 "This is my site, and this is where we're putting the  
10 equipment?" Because it sounds like, from our  
11 understanding, that the Trump campaign said we don't want  
12 it in our shot and our media shot, and then at some point  
13 the decision was reached. Okay, well, we'll just cover it  
14 with counter snipers. What agent should have been  
15 responsible for saying that is a concern and we're putting  
16 bleachers, trucks, whatever, here. And that's the end of  
17 the conversation. What agent would that have been?

18           **Witness**           I don't have firsthand knowledge of those  
19 discussions. However, just in any site, one can sometimes  
20 expect there's going to be some pushback or disagreement  
21 ultimately of where certain resources may land as a result  
22 of aesthetics. But that's the responsibility of the lead  
23 agent and the site agent to ensure that in their security  
24 plan, they're mitigating this line of sight. And if that  
25 results on following conversations or things being just

1 like anything else in life, being pushed up the chain of  
2 command, then those conversations should take place.

3 So, yeah, ultimately, it's the responsibility of the  
4 lead advance and the site agent to ensure that they have  
5 taken the appropriate steps to mitigate line of sight at  
6 their site and at their advance.

7 **PSI Majority** In retrospect, do you feel that the  
8 lead agent and the site agent were too deferential to the  
9 campaign on this?

10 **Witness** I don't have every aspect to the  
11 interactions of their conversation, but regardless of  
12 whether they were deferential or not, their job was to  
13 mitigate line of sight. And if they didn't mitigate line  
14 of sight, that's an issue.

15 **PSI Majority** And then last question. Looking back  
16 over everything that's happened and the fact that so many  
17 of the components were within the OPO, do you take any  
18 responsibility for what happened on July 13th?

19 **Witness** In regards to?

20 **PSI Majority** The security failures that happened on  
21 July 13th?

22 **Witness** Well, ultimately, I feel the Secret  
23 Service is responsible. The failure at Butler was not  
24 solely a resourcing issue. Clearly, there were gaps on the  
25 ground. You know, I wish I could be in every place at

1 every point in time. That's not possible. We're reliant  
2 on our senior leaders, of which there were multiple on the  
3 ground in their decision-making ability, and their ability  
4 to review plans and make informed decisions. And clearly,  
5 something failed that day.

6 **PSI Majority** That's it for me. Thank you.

7 **HSGAC Majority** I want to talk about areas of  
8 responsibility in each of the areas you identified as gaps  
9 or failures. You just addressed one with respect to line  
10 of sight. With respect to your earlier testimony about  
11 communications, you were not responsible for any decisions  
12 related to the establishment of the communications set up  
13 that day. Is that correct?

14 **Witness** That's correct.

15 **HSGAC Majority** Who was responsible within the Secret  
16 Service for the decision not to co-locate the command  
17 posts?

18 **Witness** I don't have knowledge of that.

19 **HSGAC Majority** Who was responsible within the Secret  
20 Service for the decision to have a U.S. Secret Service  
21 security site set up for Butler?

22 **Witness** Can you clarify your question.

23 **HSGAC Majority** Someone was responsible for advanced  
24 planning for July 13th. We know there was a lead agent --  
25 let me make sure I get the terminology correct. Was the

1 lead agent responsible for the decision to set up a U.S.  
2 Secret Service security room?

3 **Witness** The lead advance agent is responsible for  
4 setting up a comprehensive security plan that includes the  
5 ability to communicate with your Secret Service personnel,  
6 and with state, and local counterparts.

7 **HSGAC Majority** And is that same individual or somebody  
8 else responsible for the other gap? You discussed the  
9 coordination responsibility between federal, state, and  
10 local.

11 **Witness** Well, again, as I stated earlier, the  
12 reason why we have a network of field offices is they have  
13 those pre-established relationships with their state,  
14 local, and federal counterparts to implement our security  
15 plans. The field office management will establish the  
16 police meeting, provide a briefing with their local  
17 counterparts and our Secret Service personnel. It's one of  
18 the first things you do during the advance process to start  
19 to establish the framework for the security plan.

20 **HSGAC Majority** So, who is responsible?

21 **Witness** The field office management is responsible  
22 for establishing that first police meeting and establishing  
23 those relationships and the development of the security  
24 plan.

25 **HSGAC Majority** Did any issues related to the operability



1 of radio communication, Secret Service radio communications  
2 systems for July 13th rise to your office?

3 **Witness** No, they did not.

4 **HSGAC Majority** Did any concerns or questions related to  
5 coverage, responsibility, or line of sight considerations  
6 for the AGR building in advance of July 13th rise to your  
7 office?

8 **Witness** No, they did not.

9 **HSGAC Majority** Go ahead.

10 **HSGAC Minority** Was there an elevated threat environment  
11 to former President Trump on July 13th?

12 **Witness** Well, again, President Trump is a former  
13 President, was one of our most high-profile former  
14 Presidents. He was a candidate. And we obviously had  
15 concerns as he was a candidate as we would with anybody  
16 else that was a former President running as a candidate.

17 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, yes. Okay. And what about  
18 the week leading up to July 13th, same answer?

19 **Witness** In regards to what?

20 **HSGAC Minority** An elevated threat environment.

21 **Witness** Again, the director of SII would be the  
22 one to speak to his threat level. But again, we had  
23 incrementally been increasing his assets over a period of  
24 time because we had concerns with the overall threat  
25 pressure.

1           **HSGAC Minority**    In your opinion, would you characterize  
2 it as an elevated threat environment?

3           **Witness**            Compared to what a normal former President  
4 is under?

5           **HSGAC Minority**    Yes.

6           **Witness**            Yes.

7           **HSGAC Minority**    Okay. Why wasn't there a counter-  
8 surveillance unit at the Butler event?

9           **Witness**            Again, I wasn't involved in the advanced  
10 planning for the Butler event. I don't have an answer as  
11 to why counter surveillance was not requested.

12          **HSGAC Minority**    So, there were counter snipers that were  
13 at the event. There was, in your personal view, an  
14 elevated threat environment, but there wasn't a CSU. Did  
15 the individuals that could have requested a CSU, did they  
16 have an understanding of the elevated threat environment  
17 surrounding the protectee?

18          **Witness**            I would think for an outdoor site,  
19 regardless of the threat environment, one would as part of  
20 their advance process, one would request a CSU element due  
21 to the fact that they were at a large outdoor venue.

22          **HSGAC Minority**    So, in your personal opinion, should a  
23 CSU have been requested?

24          **Witness**            Again, I don't have all the information on  
25 the ground of where they might have had other resources to

1 mitigate those concerns. However, a large outdoor venue  
2 would lend itself for requesting a CSU-type asset. It  
3 could have been sourced locally from the field office,  
4 possibly. I don't know.

5 **HSGAC Minority** And do you believe if a CSU would've  
6 been requested, that it would've been provided for this  
7 event?

8 **Witness** If CSU had been requested?

9 **HSGAC Minority** Yes.

10 **HSGAC Minority** Because that request would've been, I  
11 guess, staffed by someone in that falls under your chain of  
12 command. Right?

13 **Witness** It ultimately would've come in through the  
14 Staffing and Logistics Office, and then pushed to the  
15 Directorate of SII, or would've been staffed locally  
16 through the Office of Investigations. That's not a  
17 resource that's staffed by the Office of Protective  
18 Operations. So, we did not deny any requests for CSU.

19 **HSGAC Minority** I wasn't -- and I don't believe a  
20 request was actually made for CSU, but so that -- so if a  
21 CSU request that is not approved or staffed, that doesn't  
22 fall under OPO?

23 **Witness** It does not fall under OPO.

24 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, SII or investigations  
25 actually makes a determination?

1           **Witness**           The staffing for it would likely come from  
2 the Office of Investigations to resource the allocation for  
3 the CSU team.

4           **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  Would having a CSU team there,  
5 would that have provided more personnel to potentially  
6 locate and interview the suspicious person with a range  
7 finder that Secret Service was aware of around 5:44 p.m.

8           **Witness**           Having the CSU element would've provided -  
9 - I can't say if they specifically would've found the  
10 person with the rangefinder or not, but an area of focus  
11 for CSU is the outer perimeter to look for that pre-attack  
12 behavior.  So, possibly.

13          **HSGAC Minority**   Prior to July 13th, were you aware of an  
14 Iranian assassination plot against President Trump?

15          **Witness**           I can't recall prior to July 13th if I had  
16 low-side information in regards to a possible assassination  
17 attempt in regards to Donald Trump.  So, I wouldn't be able  
18 to discuss it in this setting at this time.

19          **HSGAC Minority**   Okay.  So, prior to July 13th, were you  
20 aware that an individual, the day before the rally, so July  
21 12th, had been arrested, a Pakistani National with links to  
22 Iran, orchestrating a plot to assassinate U.S. government  
23 officials on U.S. soil?  Were you aware of that arrest  
24 prior to July 13th?

25          **Witness**           Again, ma'am, I'm trying to be transparent

1 --

2 **HSGAC Minority** I know.

3 **Witness** -- as I can. And I don't want to give the  
4 impression I'm not. There's been a lot of information out  
5 there. We're all aware of defendant Merchant that's in the  
6 news, aware of the arrest, was aware of that concern. I  
7 can't recall if I was informed of that information in the  
8 public setting in the low-side, or if there was information  
9 related to that in the classified setting.

10 **HSGAC Minority** Maybe a better way to frame this. Were  
11 you aware of it prior to the unsealing of it subsequently?  
12 So, the public -- so when it --

13 MR. **Witness Counsel** Are you asking if he was aware of the  
14 arrest of an individual prior to the arrest?

15 **HSGAC Minority** Of the unsealing? So, he was arrested  
16 on the 12th. That wasn't made public. So, DOJ did not  
17 unseal that until -- I'm sorry, I don't have the date, but  
18 I think it was like July 20-something. Or maybe, no,  
19 actually it was recent. Sorry. It was made, I think,  
20 public in August or September. So, it was sealed for quite  
21 some time. Did you become aware of the arrest prior to the  
22 unsealing?

23 MR. **Witness Counsel** So, to clarify, did he become aware of  
24 the arrest prior to the public becoming aware of the  
25 arrest?

1 **HSGAC Minority** Yes.

2 **Witness** Yes, I believe I was.

3 **HSGAC Minority** And do you recall how you became aware  
4 error?

5 **Witness** Again, all that information is received by  
6 our Directorate in SII, and then it is ultimately pushed to  
7 us, whether on the high-side or the low-side. They are the  
8 recipients of the intel.

9 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. It was August 6th. I'm going to  
10 jump real quick into something a little bit different. Are  
11 you aware of the Candidate Protection Advisory Committee?

12 **Witness** Yes, I am.

13 **HSGAC Minority** Can you tell us what that is?

14 **Witness** The Candidate Protection Advisory  
15 Committee, the CPAC, essentially as far as the Secret  
16 Service end of this, our COO is the recording secretary.  
17 She interfaces with the CPAC. It's, you know, both sides  
18 Majority and Minority leadership on both sides. And then  
19 **LES** is a participant in it. CPAC is there, again,  
20 as the words Candidate Protection Advisory Committee, if  
21 somebody makes a request for protection, it is received  
22 pushed to them.

23 The Secret Services and in this aspect the Office of  
24 Protective Operations where we just come in, is we just  
25 provide one of the DHSS criteria. And don't quote me, I

1 think it started in 2017, they have a set of criteria, one  
2 of which is polling data. You have to have a certain  
3 percentage, I think of 15 percent for over 30 days, be a  
4 candidate of a major party is another criterion in there.  
5 I don't recall all of it off the top of my head.

6 The Protective Intelligence Division -- or excuse me,  
7 SII, they provide threat assessment. That information is  
8 more or less provided to the recording secretary. That  
9 makes its way over to the CPAC. And they're an advisory  
10 body that provides a recommendation to the Secretary of  
11 Homeland, and ultimately a decision is made on whether  
12 someone will seek protection or not.

13 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, and that was both sides of  
14 the Majority, Minority leadership of Congress that serves  
15 on that advisory committee?

16 **Witness** Yes, ma'am.

17 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And so, I guess, they make a  
18 determination or recommendation about whether or not Secret  
19 Service protection should be provided to a candidate, and  
20 DHS ultimately has the ultimate authority to accept or  
21 reject that recommendation?

22 **Witness** Yes. That's my understanding, yes.

23 **HSGAC Minority** And do they only have a role in the  
24 initial determination of protection, or do they have any  
25 role in the level of protection or the assets that are

1 provided?

2 **Witness** No, I mean, they just sign off on whether  
3 the individual is going to receive protection or not.

4 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. And do you know if they receive  
5 any notifications about the level of vast protection assets  
6 that are provided for individual candidates, or is it just  
7 that's their one role? They don't receive any other  
8 information?

9 **Witness** Can you explain that a little bit more?

10 **HSGAC Minority** I guess, does Secret Service share  
11 additional information with the advisory committee?

12 **Witness** Again, my role in that process is limited  
13 to a certain degree. The COO serves as the recording  
14 secretary. She interacts with the CPAC, pushes the emails,  
15 the information. Again, as I said, the Office of  
16 Protective Operations really just provides some of the  
17 criteria, which is the polling data.

18 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. So, they don't determine the  
19 level of protection or what assets are granted, or?

20 **Witness** No.

21 **HSGAC Minority** According to publicly available  
22 documents RFK Jr.'s request for protection was sent to that  
23 Advisory Committee on June 15th, 2023. Do you know what  
24 the Advisory Committee's recommendation was?

25 **Witness** On June 15th?



1 **HSGAC Minority** Or for RFKs request for protection?

2 **Witness** Well, I know the RFK campaign had made  
3 multiple requests. I don't recall that specific one.

4 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. Do you know if multiple requests  
5 were referred to the Advisory Committee?

6 **Witness** Yes. They were referred to the Advisory  
7 Committee. I don't recall the specific one. And as I  
8 said, there were multiple requests. We kind of got used to  
9 the requests coming in.

10 **HSGAC Minority** Are you aware of any recommendations to  
11 not --

12 **Witness** I don't believe he received a  
13 recommendation to receive protection until after the 13th.

14 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. I'll pass it to **HSGAC Minority** Let's  
15 see. We've heard from individuals that we've interviewed  
16 that had they known about a general threat or a specific  
17 threat, they would have requested or asked for more  
18 resources, security resources and assets. Do you believe  
19 that all of the individuals within the Secret Service that  
20 should have been informed of a generalized threat were  
21 aware?

22 **Witness** Well, again, the entity that's responsible  
23 for disseminating that threat information is a different  
24 directorate. But again, I don't buy off on using  
25 intelligence as a springboard to deviate from some basic

1 principles.

2 **HSGAC Minority** And again, those basic principles that  
3 you believe were deviated were?

4 **Witness** Well, I think we've discussed them today.

5 **HSGAC Minority** If you could provide one recommendation  
6 on how what happened on July 13th can be insured to never  
7 happen again, what would it be?

8 **Witness** Do your job.

9 **HSGAC Minority** And do you believe that individuals know  
10 what their job is and what they should be responsible for?  
11 You think that is -- they have proper awareness of that  
12 within the Secret Service -- because we've heard a lot of,  
13 "That wasn't my job," as we've talked to people. So,  
14 that's why I ask.

15 **Witness** Well, our employees have a serious job. I  
16 mean, when I was on the President's detail, and as a GS-13,  
17 and you're doing a foreign lead advance for the President  
18 of the United States with a multi-night RON, you have a lot  
19 of responsibility that your average GS-13 in the United  
20 States government is never going to have. And we have a  
21 job that has to be taken with the utmost seriousness every  
22 day. Again, I wasn't on the ground in Butler, and I don't  
23 have the ability to get in the minds of those agents or  
24 employees. And I wish I could.

25 **HSGAC Minority** So, Special Operations Division, that

1 does that fall under OPO?

2 **Witness** Yes, ma'am. It does.

3 **HSGAC Minority** So, the counter sniper advance is  
4 technically at some level within your purview that we've  
5 been told that the counter sniper advance never went to the  
6 AGR building, never went to the AGR property. Do you think  
7 that the counter sniper advance should have walked the  
8 outer perimeter?

9 **Witness** I don't have personal knowledge that they  
10 never went to the AGR building. I was told after the fact  
11 they did do a walkthrough on 7/11, tactical walkthrough.  
12 Obviously, that was related to me secondhand. I wasn't  
13 there, but I was told that did occur. I was told that they  
14 did go through their GRG, which is a graphic reference  
15 grid, that basically provides maps, diagrams of the site  
16 with a local counterpart.

17 Again, I don't have all aspects and information to the  
18 investigation, but again, those are things to me that they  
19 are taking proactive steps to interface with their local  
20 counterparts which did not lend itself to the fact that  
21 they never went to the AGR cluster of buildings. I can't  
22 say with certainty they didn't, but I was told those things  
23 I just stated here in this room.

24 **HSGAC Minority** Were you ever told that the counter  
25 sniper advance went to the AGR property or to the building?

1           **Witness**           I wasn't told that they didn't, or they  
2 did. I was told they did a walk around a walkthrough with  
3 their tactical counterparts on 7/11. One can never presume  
4 anything, but I would think that would be inclusive of the  
5 cluster of AGR buildings at the 3 o'clock, which is one of  
6 the biggest issues of line of sight at the property.

7           **HSGAC Minority**   And the counter sniper advance, is there  
8 days in advance to be on the property and do these  
9 walkthroughs as opposed to relying on images and things  
10 that they could do from --

11          **Witness**           Yes.

12          **HSGAC Minority**   -- another location? Right. Okay. The  
13 counter sniper advance told us that he got on the barn  
14 roofs of where your Secret Service counter snipers were  
15 located. And he just was trying to see if they would fall  
16 through the barn as opposed to really evaluating and  
17 assessing 360, the line-of-sight concerns to the stage. Do  
18 you believe that that is proper advance work?

19          MR. **Witness Counsel**   Can I just ask? Are you saying you were  
20 told by witnesses this or --

21          **HSGAC Minority**   Yes.

22          MR. **Witness Counsel**   -- you're presenting the hypothetical to  
23 him?

24          **HSGAC Minority**   No, I'm telling. Yes.

25          **Witness**           I have no knowledge of if that is true.

1 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. But if it were true, do you think  
2 that that is appropriate advance work, given that this  
3 person falls at some level to under your chain of command?

4 **Witness** So, you're stating that someone stated  
5 that the counter sniper got on the roof and just was  
6 concerned about falling through the roof rather than --

7 **HSGAC Minority** I'm saying, should the counter sniper  
8 advance be taking into account from the positions where the  
9 countersnipers are going to be located, should he be  
10 taking in into consideration all line-of-sight concerns to  
11 the protectee?

12 **Witness** Yes. I mean, that's the basics of the --  
13 I was never a counter sniper, but I know enough about the  
14 counter sniper program that, essentially, you're trying to  
15 see those positions of line of sight from where the  
16 protectee is standing.

17 Again, I will mention during their advance process,  
18 they did do satellite photos. They did do a graphic  
19 reference grid. They did do **LES**. So, that would seem  
20 to be counterintuitive to whatever this witness is saying,  
21 but I don't have personal knowledge of that.

22 **HSGAC Minority** Did you ever talk to the counter sniper  
23 advance that did the advance for the Butler rally?

24 **Witness** No. I purposely haven't talked to him  
25 because I don't want to be perceived as trying to coerce or

1 manipulate the investigative process. That's something  
2 that they should do.

3 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. Did anyone within your office do  
4 an assessment of whether the counter sniper advance  
5 properly conducted his advance?

6 **Witness** I did speak to some of the management from  
7 Counter Sniper. Again, as I said, in the limited  
8 conversations I had with them, it wasn't as if he showed up  
9 for his advance and didn't meet with his local  
10 counterparts, didn't do his survey, didn't take his photos,  
11 to your earlier point. So, there was nothing glaring from  
12 those limited conversations I had with them in regards to  
13 the advance process. I've never heard what you stated in  
14 regards to he was concerned about falling through the roof.

15 **HSGAC Minority** Or, you know, that's kind of what he  
16 relayed to us is what his focus was when he was on the barn  
17 roofs. I mean, at the end of the day, the individual took  
18 a shot and killed someone. So, I think the line-of-sight  
19 concern was not completely mitigated because he was able to  
20 take a shot. And I mean, in your view, were the line-of-  
21 sight concerns properly mitigated?

22 **Witness** Well, again, as I stated earlier, this  
23 should be a shared responsibility. And again, when I was  
24 on the President's detail, and if you were doing an  
25 airport, you as the site agent, it would be your

1 responsibility to somehow, you know, secure box trucks or  
2 whatever to put along the fence line to mitigate line of  
3 sight in that aspect. I question, and I don't have  
4 firsthand knowledge, but I question what the site agent's  
5 efforts were to mitigate those line-of-sight issues.

6 **HSGAC Minority** And when you say site agents, you were  
7 told that there were two site agents. One from Pittsburgh  
8 and one from the Trump detail. Are you speaking to both of  
9 those people?

10 **Witness** Well, yeah. I would say there was a  
11 shared responsibility there. If you're a site agent, it's  
12 your site. You want to make sure it's secure and you want  
13 to mitigate line of sight issues.

14 **HSGAC Minority** Okay. I'll turn it over to **HSGAC Minority**

15 **HSGAC Minority** I just want to follow-up with a couple  
16 things. Thankfully, we're getting back to the questions  
17 that I asked initially, and we're getting some answers.  
18 Because it goes back to what I showed you in your own  
19 protective intelligence on the document I showed you,  
20 Exhibit 2, meticulous advance work.

21 And I ask the question, would this amount to  
22 meticulous advance work? It's obviously, it did not. It's  
23 obvious from your own testimony there that if people  
24 would've done certain things that she had just brought up,  
25 then it would result in a failure, or it would be a failure

1 of meticulous advance work.

2 So, we look -- had the side agent, the lead agent, the  
3 counter sniper advance, from your testimony, those all  
4 shared a responsibility of ensuring the line of sight was  
5 mitigated from the AGR. Whether it was to keep someone off  
6 the roof, block the line of sight, or properly have a  
7 ability to do so. Am I correct on that? All would share  
8 the responsibility?

9 **Witness** Yes, sir.

10 **HSGAC Minority** So, you've probably heard the saying,  
11 routine traffic stop, right, in law enforcement?

12 **Witness** Sure.

13 **HSGAC Minority** We know that's not true.

14 **Witness** No.

15 **HSGAC Minority** There's no traffic stop that's ever  
16 routine.

17 **Witness** No.

18 **HSGAC Minority** Also, have you ever heard the routine  
19 event, just a routine event? It's not true, is it?

20 **Witness** No.

21 **HSGAC Minority** Because every event's different. Do  
22 you feel like there's an element of complacency, or as I've  
23 always been told, casual is one syllable from casualty.  
24 And what you know now, do you feel like there was an  
25 element of casualness and complacency that led to the



1 multiple failures that we've talked about today?

2 **Witness** I don't have insight into the mindset of  
3 each individual that was on that advance team, but  
4 regardless of mindset, clearly there was gaps in their  
5 planning process that led to a failure.

6 **HSGAC Minority** And the last thing I'll say, it's just  
7 the irony of it all, is that the first time we put counter  
8 snipers on the roof for a former President's event, is the  
9 one the time that someone exploited weaknesses that were  
10 not properly mitigated by the United States Secret Service.  
11 That's concerning to many people.

12 And I want to ask you this, is that concerning to you  
13 knowing that that's the first time we did this because of  
14 an elevated risk, but even with that enhancement of an  
15 added layer of protection, because we work in layers of  
16 protection, an individual is still able to take the life of  
17 Corey Comperatore and shoot three other people? Is that  
18 concerning to you?

19 **Witness** It's beyond concerning.

20 **HSGAC Minority** And I understand. Thank you. That's  
21 all I have.

22 **HSGAC Majority** Okay. I thank you, **Witness** I want to  
23 thank counsel. I know we went over, and I appreciate your  
24 staying to answer those questions. I will reiterate,  
25 please do not discuss the contents of the interview today

1 so we can preserve the integrity of our review. And we  
2 will collect the exhibits. This will conclude the  
3 interview. And again, thank you very much for your service  
4 and for your time.

5 **Witness** Thank you.

6 [Whereas, at 5:23 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

USSS Assistant Director for the Office of Protective Operations – September 13, 2024

Combined Errata

Page	Line	Correction
52	1	Strike “of”
52	2	Insert “I” between “actually” and “recently”
52	2	Strike “wrote” and replace with “read”
53	24	Strike “this”
55	23	Strike “resource” and replace with “resources”
56	12	Strike “in” and replace with “on”
57	25	Add “ before “Immediate”
63	10	Add “?” to end of line
64	9	Add “of” after “knowledge”
68	8	Add “are” before the second “they”
93	21	Strike “if” and replace with “in”
104	8	Strike “NRC” and replace with “RNC”
122	11	Strike “in”
122	21	Strike “that”
123	22	Add “for” before “orchestrating”
125	4	Strike “error”
130	4	Strike “that” and replace with “and”

Witness Counsel Errata

Page	Line	Correction
15	22	It appears that “instruments, implements” is in error; based on our best recollection, the witness said “plans, implements, and directs policies...” Thus “instruments” is likely a misstatement of the word “implements.”
17	7	The word “standards” should be deleted and replaced with “standers.” As with other similar corrections below, the witness was describing the role of an individual who is assigned to stand at a specific post; they are referred to as “post standers.”
17	8	The word “report” should be deleted and replaced with “support.”
17	9	The word “report” should be deleted and replaced with “support.”
19	21	The word “advanced” should be deleted and replaced with “advance.” The witness was referring to the process of conducting “advance” on a trip or visit of a protectee.
20	5-7	It appears the phrase “rise that my occasion” is in error. To the best of our recollection, the witness said, “...as issues arise, if something was to rise to my attention, that would be an anomaly.”

20	10	The word “advanced” should be deleted and replaced with “advance.”
22	20	The word “standards” should be deleted and replaced with “standers.”
22	21	The word “standards” should be deleted and replaced with “standers.”
26	14	The acronym “POC” should be deleted and replaced with “PIOC.” The next line identifies the full name from which the PIOC derives: Protective Intelligence Operations Center.
29	20	The word “seat” should be deleted and replaced with “sheet.” The rest of the witness’s answer describes the sheet containing a “list of projected visits.”
30	18	The acronym “DDS” should be deleted and replaced with “DADs.” This is in reference to “Deputy Assistant Directors,” which is used in the subsequent line (line 19).
35	4	The word “tic” should be deleted. The witness was saying the phrase, “trip director,” in reference to an agent who coordinates information about a planned trip.
43	25	The acronym “DDs” should be deleted and replaced with “DADs.”
45	24	The acronym “DDs” should be deleted and replaced with “DAD.”
46	5	The acronym “DDs” should be deleted and replaced with “DADs.”
46	16	The word “earlier” should be deleted and replaced with “early.”
49	24	The word “decks” should be deleted and replaced with “desk.”
54	24	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “directive.” The witness was answering a question about how a decision (or “determination”) was implemented (see Page 54 Line 2, and Page 54 Line 21).
60	7	The word “reads” should be deleted and replaced with “read-ins.” The witness was describing the act of someone being “read-in” to intelligence information.
65	7	To the best of our knowledge, the word “deputy” should be inserted before the phrase “assistant directors.” We acknowledge this is a question from <b>HSGAC Minority</b> , not a statement from the witness, but believe that her question was referring to a conversation with the <b>Witness</b> and two deputy assistant directors.
68	14	The word “Director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
72	13-15	The grammar and punctuation of this section should be adjusted to reflect the witness identifying 3 separate “rings” of protection. The sentences should read: “We have three rings of protection, of 360 coverage: inner (it’s mostly Secret Service);

		middle (Secret Service and police); and our outer perimeter, which starts to become more of our external partners.”
90	24	The word “preparatory” should be deleted and replaced with “prefatory.” In asking for clarification from <b>PSI Minority</b> , I was noting that the witness had previously indicated that he did not conduct the investigation <b>PSI Minority</b> was inquiring about.
93	6	The word “hole” should be deleted and replaced with “whole.” The sentence structure should be adjusted to reflect a continuous thought: “So, I don’t really put much stock in the whole – there’s been this whole notion of radios and radio.”
98	8	The word “Directorate” should be deleted and replaced “Director’s,” as in “Director’s Crisis Center.”
98	12	The word “directorate” should be deleted and replaced with “Director’s.”
98	15	The second acronym (NRC) should be “RNC.”
99	5	The phrase “was at his hands full” should be deleted and replaced with “he had his hands full.”
102	21	The word “side” should be deleted and replaced with “site.”
112	12	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
112	19	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
113	8	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
114	2	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
114	14	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
114	21	The word “director” should be deleted and replaced with “Directorate.”
125	25	The acronym “DHSS” should be deleted and replaced with “DHS,” referring to the Department of Homeland Security.